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In this paper we provide a survey of the payment literature in a uniﬁ  ed framework. The 
environment is a variant of the Lagos and Wright (2005) model of monetary exchange, 
where some trades occur in bilateral meetings while others occur in more or less 
decentralized markets. We use this basic environment to introduce alternative sets 
of trading frictions that give rise to different payments instruments and/or payments 
institutions. We investigate credit economies, monetary economies, and economies 
in which money and credit coexist. We also study alternative assets, such as foreign 
exchange, capital (equity), and government liabilities, which can be used as payment 
instruments in conjunction with money. We introduce banks as deposit-taking institutions 
whose liabilities circulate in the economy. We also provide an extension in which the 
process of the settlement of debt for money is modeled and the potential social costs of 
settlement are characterized. Finally, we investigate government policy responses to the 
social costs introduced by various trading frictions.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
Table of Contents
Introduction ...............................................................................................................1
The Basic Environment  ..............................................................................................2
Pure Credit Economies ..............................................................................................3
Credit with Commitment ...................................................... 4
Credit with Public Recordkeeping ........................................ 6
Credit with Reputation ........................................................ 10
Related Literature ................................................................. 14
Pure Monetary Economies  .......................................................................................14
Money Is Memory ................................................................ 15
Indivisible Money and Currency Shortage .......................... 17
Indivisible Money and Lotteries .......................................... 20
Divisible Money ................................................................... 21
Related Literature ................................................................. 22
Coexistence of Money and Credit ...........................................................................23
Value Functions  .................................................................... 24
Terms of Trade  ...................................................................... 25
Equilibrium .......................................................................... 26
Related Literature ................................................................. 27
Alternative Media of Exchange ................................................................................28
Money and Capital ............................................................... 28
Dual-Currency Payment Systems ......................................... 31
Government Liabilities as Means of Payment ...................... 32
Related Literature ................................................................. 35
Banking ....................................................................................................................36
Banks and Safekeeping Services .......................................... 36
Private Money ...................................................................... 38
Related Literature ................................................................. 41
Settlement ................................................................................................................41
The Environment ................................................................. 42
Frictionless Settlement  ......................................................... 43
Settlement and Liquidity ...................................................... 45
Settlement and Default Risk  ................................................. 48
Related Literature ................................................................. 50
Policy and Payments ................................................................................................50
Optimality of the Friedman Rule ......................................... 50
Trading Frictions and the Friedman Rule ............................ 52
Distributional Effects of Monetary Policy  ............................ 55
Settlements and Monetary Policy ........................................ 56
Related Literature ................................................................. 58
References ................................................................................................................59FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
1
Introduction 
Economics is all about exchange, but exchange need not be seamless. How else can one 
explain the existence of the myriad assets and institutions—domestic currency, bank de-
posits, bonds, capital, large value payments systems, such as Fedwire and CHIPS, foreign 
exchange and the foreign exchange market, to name but a few—whose main purpose 
is to facilitate trade? In the real world, trade between agents is not conducted in a fric-
tionless environment, as, for example, it is in an Arrow–Debreu economy. Instead, real re-
sources must be used in order for exchange to take place at all and, as a result, people 
will attempt to design instruments of exchange that will economize on resource use. The 
precise instrument or institution that one might use will depend upon the obstacles or 
frictions that agents face in a particular trade. So, in our view, the existence of trading fric-
tions implies that agents will use some sort of instrument, asset, or institution to facilitate 
trade, and the instrument, asset, or institution that is actually used will depend upon the 
nature of the trading friction(s) that agents face.
There does not really exist a well-deﬁ  ned literature on the economics of payments. 
There are, of course, comprehensive literatures on credit, money, foreign currencies, 
banking, and so on. But, by and large, these literatures have evolved independently of one 
another and may have quite different focuses. For example, in the banking literature, there 
are large bodies of works on bank runs and optimal lending contracts, but little time has 
been spent on banks’ liabilities as a medium of exchange. An implication of this indepen-
dent development is that the economic environments in these various literatures are not 
necessarily comparable. Indeed, even within a literature there is considerable variation 
in the speciﬁ  cation of economic environments. This lack of comparability or a common 
model environment is problematic if one is interested in understanding, for example, why 
one set of payment instruments might emerge in one situation and not another. In this 
Policy Discussion Paper, a common economic environment is used, one that models ex-
change between agents. Within this common economic environment, alternative sets of 
trading frictions are introduced, where different sets of frictions may give rise to different 
payments instruments and/or payments institutions. The beneﬁ  t of our approach is that 
one will be able to associate the particular trading frictions with payment instruments. 
Government policy can be thought of in terms of attempting to counteract these trading 
frictions, either directly or indirectly.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin by describing the common model envi-
ronment that will be used throughout the paper; it is a variation of the Lagos–Wright 
model of exchange. We then proceed to consider alternative sets of trading frictions that 
give rise to different payments instruments. First we investigate the use of only credit 
in exchange, then the use of only money. In reality, both money and credit are used to 
facilitate exchange,  so we next combine the trading environments of the previous sec-POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 12, DECEMBER 2005
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tions to explain the coexistence of money and credit in trade. Although money seems to 
be central to exchange, in practice money as well as other assets are used in trade. We 
next study alternative assets, such as foreign exchange, capital (equity) and government 
liabilities that can be used as payments instruments in conjunction with money. Banks 
are intermediaries and have long been considered facilitators of trade, so we proceed 
to show how a deposit-taking institution, whose liabilities circulate in the economy, can 
be a useful institution of trade. In practice, virtually all debt is settled with some form of 
money. But the very act of settlement can introduce additional frictions into a trading 
environment. So we model the process of settlement of debt for money and character-
ize the potential social costs of settlement. Finally, we investigate government policy 
responses to the social costs introduced by the various trading frictions that have been 
discussed in previous sections.
The Basic Environment
We consider a simple model to describe different payments methods to carry out trades. 
The benchmark model is as follows: Time is discrete and continues forever. Each period 
is divided into two subperiods, day and night. During the day, trades occur in decentral-
ized markets according to a bilateral matching process. Each agent meets a trading part-
ner with probability σ . During the day, some agents can produce but do not want to 
consume, while other agents want to consume but cannot produce. We call the former 
agents buyers and the latter sellers, and the measures of buyers and sellers are normalized 
to one. This generates a simple double-coincidence-of-wants problem in the decentralized 
market. The double-coincidence-of-wants problem can be exacerbated by, for example, 
having sellers produce different kinds of goods and having buyers wanting to consume 
only certain types of goods. All this can be captured by the parameter σ . Below, we will 
be explicit in terms of the lack of double coincidence problem. We will call the good that 
is produced and traded during the day the search good, since buyers and sellers are ran-
domly matched and trade is decentralized.
Exactly how production and trade are organized at night will depend upon the issue 
that is under investigation. What can be said about the night market is that, in general, it 
will be characterized by fewer frictions than those that plague the morning market. At 
night, all agents can produce and consume. The good that is produced and consumed at 
night will be called the  general good.
Search goods can only be produced during the day and general goods can only be 
produced at night. All goods, whether produced in the day or at night, are nonstorable, so 
a search good cannot be carried over to the night and a general good cannot be carried 
over to the next day.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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The period utility functions for buyers and sellers are given by  
(1)  Uq x u q x
b(,) () , =+
(2)  Uq x c q x
s(,) () , =− +
where q is the quantity of the search good consumed and produced during the day, and 
x is the net consumption—the difference between what is consumed and produced—
of the general good at night. We assume  ′ > uq () , 0 ′′ < uq () , 0 ucc () () () , 00 0 0 == ′ =  
′ > cq () , 0   ′′ > cq () , 0 and cq uq () () =  for some q > 0. All agents discount between the 
night and the next day at rate r =−
− β
1 1,  where  β ∈(,) . 01  Lifetime utility for agent 
ii ,{ } , ∈ buyer,seller  at date j is given by Σtj
tj i Uq x =
∞− β (,) .  Let q *  denote the efﬁ  cient 
(static) level of production and consumption of the search good, where q *  is the solu-
tion to  ′ = ′ uq cq (* ) (* ) .  Note that the linear speciﬁ  cation goods produced and consumed 
at night implies that there is no beneﬁ  t associated with producing the general good for 
one’s own consumption.
We deﬁ  ne a trade match to be a match between a buyer and seller during the day, 
where the buyer wants the good that the seller can produce, the seller is actually able to 
produce the good, and the buyer has the resources to pay for the good. We assume that 
agents always have the option to “exit” or not participate in any particular market or mar-
kets, but can always return.
Generally speaking, we adopt the benchmark model speciﬁ  cation in all of the discus-
sions that follow. Without exception, the day market, with its bilateral matching of agents 
and its lack of a double-coincidence-of-wants problem, will be common to all of the envi-
ronments discussed below. At times, however, we may depart slightly from the speciﬁ  ca-
tion of our benchmark model. When this does happen, we will be very clear in explaining 
both how and why we are modifying the benchmark model.
Pure Credit Economies
In this section, we consider environments with the following characteristics: First, a 
match between a buyer and a seller that is formed during the day is maintained at night. 
The fact that agents are matched for the entire period allows them to make promises or 
“write” debt contracts during the day, which can be settled at night. Second, there are 
no frictions or costs associated with settling debt at night: An agent can settle his debt at 
night by simply producing the general good and transferring it to his creditor. Third, there 
are no assets, e.g., money, that agents can use for trade purposes. So agents can only trade 
by using credit arrangements. An environment that satisﬁ  es these characteristics will be 
referred to as a credit economy. We are interested in characterizing the set of allocations 
that can be implemented as an equilibrium in a credit economy.POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 12, DECEMBER 2005
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The extent to which a particular allocation can be implemented in a credit economy 
depends on the degree of commitment that agents possess, as well as methods available 
for punishing a debtor who reneges on his obligations. We will consider three related 
environments in which credit arrangements can be sustained. We ﬁ  rst assume that agents 
have the ability to commit to repay their debts. We then consider an environment where 
agents cannot commit but there exists a public recordkeeping device that can monitor 
agents’ production levels. Finally, we assume that agents are able to form long-term part-
nerships, where trading relationships can be sustained by reputations.
Credit with Commitment 
We ﬁ rst consider an economy where buyers can commit to repay their debts. Since com-
mitment may be interpreted as a rather strong assumption, we will limit the extent to 
which agents (and, in particular, buyers) are able to commit. We assume that in the day 
market, buyers can promise to undertake future actions, but only for the subsequent 
night market. This assumption implies, among other things, that private debt will not cir-
culate across periods.
We will describe the set of allocations that are feasible in the sense that they are in ac-
cordance with agents’ willingness to trade. We restrict the set of allocations to those that 
are symmetric across matches and that are constant across time. To ﬁ  nd these allocations, 
we assume the following simple trading mechanism: When a match is formed during the 
day, the buyer and seller must consider implementing the allocation (q,y), where q is the 
quantity of the search good produced by the seller for the buyer in the day and y is the 
amount of the general good that the buyer promises to produce and deliver to the seller 
at night. When a buyer and seller are in a trade match, they must decide simultaneously 
whether to accept or reject allocation (q,y). This allocation is implemented only if both 
agents accept it.
The sequence of events within a typical period is as follows: At the very beginning of 
the period, all agents are unmatched. During the day, each agent ﬁ  nds a trading partner 
with probability σ . The buyer and seller in a trade match decide simultaneously whether 
to accept or reject the proposed allocation (q,y). If either player rejects the proposed 
allocation, the match is dissolved; otherwise, the seller produces q units of the search 
good for the buyer during the day and the buyer produces y units of the general good 
for the seller at night. At the end of the period, all matches are terminated. Without loss, 
unmatched agents and matched agents who rejected the proposed allocation simply exit 
the night market and re-enter the day market in the next period.
The value function for a buyer evaluated at the beginning of the day market is
(3)  Vu q y V
bb =− [] + σβ () ,
assuming, of course, that both the buyer and seller accept allocation (q,y).  According to FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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(3), the buyer meets a seller with probability σ  and, in the event that he meets a seller, 
he consumes q units of the search good and produces y units of the general good. Note 
that there is no state variable that characterizes the lifetime expected utility of a buyer 
since agents hold no assets at the beginning of the period, and the agents’ trading histo-
ries are irrelevant. In addition, since we focus on stationary allocations, time indexes are 
suppressed on variables and functions. The value function of a seller evaluated at the be-
ginning of the day market is
(4)  Vc q y V
ss =− + [] + σβ () .
Equation (4) has an interpretation similar to (3), except for the fact that during the day 
sellers produce (and buyers consume) the search good and at night sellers consume (and 
buyers produce) the general good.
Since agents are able to commit, the only relevant constraints are buyers’ and sellers’ 
participation constraints, which are evaluated at the time that a match is formed. The 
participation constraints indicate whether agents are willing to participate in a given 
mechanism or to go along with a given allocation. These constraints are
(5)  uq y V V
bb () , −+ ≥ ββ
(6)  −+ +≥ cq y V V
ss () . ββ
According to (5), a buyer will accept allocation (q,y) if the lifetime utility associated with 
acceptance, the left-hand side of (5), exceeds the lifetime utility associated with rejec-
tion, the right-hand side of (5), or if his surplus from the trade, uq y () , −  is non-negative. 
Condition (6) has a similar interpretation for the seller. From (5) and (6), the set of incen-
tive-feasible allocations, A




C qy cq y uq =∈ ≤ ≤ {} + (,) :() () . R
2
From (7) it is easy to check that {* }[(* ) ,(* ) ] . qc q u q
C ×⊆ A This implies that the efﬁ  cient 
level of production and consumption of the search good, q*, is incentive-feasible for any 
values of β  and σ . In presence of commitment, the intertemporal nature of the trades 
and any associated moral hazard considerations are irrelevant.
Hence, the gains from trade will be maximized if agents produce and consume q *  
units of the search good in the day. And the level of output for the general good, y, will 
determine how the gains from trade are split between the buyer and seller. But since any 
allocation in A
C  is incentive-feasible, which of these allocations will be implemented? 
Can agents somehow agree to produce q *  units of the search good? If so, how is y 
determined? One way to address these questions is to impose a bargaining procedure 
for bilateral matches and to characterize the outcome of the bargaining procedure. For POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 12, DECEMBER 2005
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example, we can assume that the allocation (q,y) is determined in accordance with the 
generalized Nash bargaining solution, where the buyer’s bargaining power is θ ∈(,) . 01  
The generalized Nash bargaining solution maximizes a weighted geometric mean of the 
buyer’s surplus, uq y () , −  and the seller’s surplus, −+ cq y () ,  from trade, where the 
weights are given by the agents’ bargaining power. The generalized Nash bargaining solu-
tion is given by the solution to
(8)
 
max ( ) ( ) .
, qy
uq y y cq − [] − []
− θθ 1
The solution to (8) is qq = *  and  yu q c q =− + () ( * )( * ) . 1 θθ Note that the allocation is 
efﬁ  cient for any buyer’s bargaining power θ  in the sense that the level of the search pro-
duction is always at the efﬁ  cient level q *. Furthermore, as one varies θ  over [0,1], the 
set of generalized Nash bargaining solutions is given by { *} [ ( *), ( *)]; qc q u q × as θ  increas-
es, the buyer’s share of the surplus increases and the seller’s share decreases.
Credit with Public Recordkeeping 
In this section, we relax the assumption of commitment. In order to sustain trade in a 
credit economy when agents cannot commit, they must experience some sort of nega-
tive consequence if they do not deliver on their promises. The punishment that we im-
pose is that an agent can no longer use credit if he fails to pay back his debt obligation. 
Furthermore, we will consider global punishments, in the sense that the entire economy 
reverts to autarky if at least one agent behaves in an opportunistic manner.
When there is a large number of agents in the economy, there must be some sort of 
public recordkeeping of agents’ trades if punishments are to be feasible and effective. We 
assume that there exists a public-record device that provides all agents in the economy 
with the list of quantities of the search and general goods that were produced and traded 
during the period. In particular, the pair (q,y) is recorded for all agents in a trade match, 
and this information is made available at the end of each period, i.e., at the end of each 
night. Note that the public record lists only quantities, not the names of the agents who 
produced the quantities. It is for this reason that any deviation from proposed play will 
result in a global punishment. If names were associated with quantities, then nonglobal 
(personalized) punishments would be possible. It turns out that very little is changed if 
nonglobal punishments are possible, and we discuss the implications of nonglobal pun-
ishments at the end of this section.
The chronology of events is as follows: At the beginning of the day market, buyers and 
sellers are randomly matched and meet a trading partner with probability σ . In each 
trade match, an allocation (q,y) is proposed and agents simultaneously accept or reject 
trade at those terms. If the allocation is accepted, then the seller produces q units of the 
search good for the buyer. At night, the buyer chooses to either produce y units of the FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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general good for the seller or to renege on his promise and produce nothing. At the end 
of the night, a list of all the pairs of the day and night production levels for agents who 
were in a trade match is publicly observed. Based on this list, agents decide whether or 
not to enter the morning search market or exit the day and night markets forever to live 
in autarky.
We restrict our attention to symmetric stationary allocations (q,y) that are incentive-
feasible. Incentive-feasibility now implies that not only do the buyer and the seller agree 
to allocation (q,y), as before, but that the buyer is willing to repay his debt when it is 
his turn to produce. We assume that agents choose autarky at the end of the night when-
ever an allocation from any trade match is different from the proposed allocation (q,y). 
(Indeed, having all agents revert to autarky is an equilibrium outcome in this situation.) 
During the day, matched sellers and buyers agree to a trade (q,y) if
(9)  −+ +≥ cq y V
s () , β 0
(10)  uq y V
b () . −+ ≥ β 0
Condition (9), which is the seller’s participation constraint, says that a seller prefers allo-
cation (q,y) plus the continuation value of participating in future day and night markets, 
βV
s, to autarky at the time when the match is formed. The seller compares the payoff 
associated with acceptance to that of autarky because if the seller rejects the proposal, 
a (0,0) trade will be recorded and such a trade will trigger global autarky. The condition 
(10) has an interpretation similar to (9) but for the buyer; i.e., the buyer prefers to go 
along with the suggested trade (q,y) rather than go to autarky. Note that the participa-
tion constraints (9) and (10) differ from the participation constraints when agents could 
commit, (5) and (6), in that now agents go to autarky if they do not accept the proposed 
allocation (q,y).
Since the buyer produces the general good after he consumes the search good, we 
now need to check that the buyer is, in fact, willing to produce. The buyer will have an 
incentive to produce the general good for the seller if
(11)  −+ ≥ yV
b β 0.
The left-hand side of inequality (11) is the buyer’s payoff if he repays his debt by produc-
ing y units of output for the seller and the right-hand side is his continuation payoff of 
zero if he defaults (since the economy reverts to autarky). Clearly, if the buyer’s incentive 
constraint (11) is satisﬁ  ed, then so is his participation constraint (10).
Equations (3) and (4) still represent the beginning-of-period value functions for the 
buyer and seller, respectively. Using these Bellman equations, the seller’s participation 
constraint (9) and the buyer’s incentive constraint (11) can be re-expressed, respectively, asPOLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 12, DECEMBER 2005
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1 1. Condition (12) simply says that the seller has to get some of the sur-
plus from the trade match to be willing to participate in the trade. Note that this partici-
pation condition does not depend on discount factors or matching probabilities. Condi-
tion (13) is the incentive constraint for the buyer to repay his debt. The left-hand side of 
(13) is the buyer’s expected payoff beginning next period if he pays back his debt; it is 
the discount sum of the expected surplus from trade in future periods. This term depends 
on the frequency of trades, σ , and on the discount rate, r. The right-hand side of (13) is 
the buyer’s (lifetime) gain if he does not produce the general good for the seller. Not sur-
prising, because a necessary—but not sufﬁ  cient—condition for inequality (13) to hold is 
that the buyer’s surplus from the trade is positive, i.e., uq y () . −≥ 0
The set of incentive-feasible allocations, A
PR, when agents cannot commit but when 




PR qy cq y
r








+ (,) :() (). R
2 σ
σ
The set of incentive-feasible allocations, A
PR, is smaller than the set of incentive-feasible 
allocations when agents can commit, A
C . This is a consequence of the additional buyer 
incentive constraint, (11), which must be imposed when buyers are unable to commit to 
repay their debts. Note that the set A
PR  expands as the frequency of trades, σ , increases 
or as agents become more patient, i.e., when r decreases and when r → 0,  AA
PR C → . 










The right-hand side of (15) is increasing in σ  and decreasing in r. Suppose that inequal-
ity (15) holds for a particular σ  and r.  Then if σ  decreases, the probability of ﬁ  nding a 
future match decreases and, hence, the buyer has a greater incentive not to produce y 
since the beneﬁ  t of avoiding autarky has now been reduced. If σ  falls sufﬁ  ciently, then 
the buyer will not, for sure, produce any general good for the seller and, therefore, the ef-
ﬁ  cient level of production and consumption of the search good is not incentive-feasible. 
Similarly, if buyers discount the future more heavily, i.e., if β  decreases or if r increases, 
the buyer will have a greater incentive not to produce y since he cares more about his 
current payoff than future payoffs. Once again, if r increases sufﬁ  ciently, the efﬁ  cient level 
of production and consumption of the search good is not incentive-feasible.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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Another way to think about inequality (15) is as follows. For each level of search fric-
tion in the day market, σ ∈(,] , 01  there exists a threshold for the discount factor, βσ () ,  
such that if ββ σ ≥ () ,  then the efﬁ  cient allocation  (* ,* ) qy is incentive-feasible. This 
threshold  βσ ()  is a decreasing function of σ , which means that the efﬁ  cient level of 
production and consumption of the search good, q*, is easier to sustain when there are 
few frictions in the day market. If, however, βσ β () , ≤  incentive-feasible allocations are 
such that the output level of the search good, q, is inefﬁ  ciently low, i.e., qq < *.
Instead of characterizing the set of all incentive-feasible allocations one can, alterna-
tively, focus on the allocation that would be suggested by a bargaining solution; for in-
stance, the generalized Nash bargaining solution. The bargaining outcome, (q,y), in a 
trade match now needs to be restricted to take into account the condition under which 
the buyer has an incentive to repay his debt. When agents are unable to commit, but there 
is a public recordkeeping device, the generalized Nash bargaining solution is given by
(16)
 
max ( ) ( ) ,
, qy
uq y y cq − [] − []
− θθ 1
(17)  s.t.    −+ ≥ yV
b β 0.
The solution to this problem is given by qq = *  and  yu q c q y =− + ≡ () ( * )( * )* 1 θθ  if 
βVy
b ≥ *; and θθ ′ −= ′ −− uq y cq cq u q y () [ () ] () ( ) [() ] 1  and  yV
b = β  otherwise. When 
βVy
b ≥ *, the generalized Nash bargaining solution here corresponds exactly to the gen-
eralized Nash bargaining solution when agents are able to commit. Otherwise, the bar-
gaining solutions will differ. When the buyer lacks commitment, he has an “outside op-
tion” of not producing the general good for the seller. If the proposed bargaining outcome 
(* ,* ) qy does not provide the buyer with sufﬁ  cient surplus, then the buyer will choose 
not to produce the general good for the seller, and this happens when βVy
b < *. In such 
a situation the unconstrained generalized Nash bargaining solution (* ,* ) qy will not be 
incentive-feasible and the constrained generalized Nash bargaining solution (q,y)  will 
be characterized by qq < * and  yy < *.When agents are unable to commit, it can be 


















Inequality (18) implies that a necessary condition for (* ,* ) qy to be the generalized Nash 
bargaining solution is that the term in the square brackets on the left-hand side of the in-
equality is greater than zero, or that θσ >+ rr /( ).Hence, buyers must have sufﬁ  ciently 
high bargaining power in order to obtain the efﬁ  cient consumption and production of 
the search good. Note also that conditions (15) and (18) coincide whenever θ =1,  i.e., 
when buyers have all the bargaining power.POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 12, DECEMBER 2005
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We conclude this section with a brief discussion of punishments. First, we have as-
sumed that if agents in a trade match do not accept the proposed offer, then the economy 
will forever revert to autarky in the next period. Suppose instead that we assume that 
only outputs produced from accepted proposals become part of the public record—i.e., 
agents could, without impunity, reject the proposed offer. Now, the agents’ participation 
constraints are given by (5) and (6), instead of (9) and (10); for this case, it can be shown 
that all of the above results still go through. This, perhaps, should not be so surprising 
because as long as agents receive some surplus from trade, they will always accept the 
proposed offer. Second, we have assumed that if an agent defects from proposed play, 
then the economy will revert to global autarky forever. This is because an agent defecting 
from equilibrium play is not identiﬁ  ed by other agents in the economy, except his trading 
partner. Since the trading partner is of measure zero, the defector could escape individual 
punishment even if his trading partner and subsequent trading partners of that trading 
partner could credibly pass on the message that a particular agent defected from equi-
librium play. If, however, in addition to the list of outputs that are observed at the end of 
the night market, the name associated with each output is observed, then it is possible to 
support credit arrangements through individual punishments; that is, the above credit 
arrangements can be sustained without having to revert to global autarky in the event of 
a defection from a proposed allocation.
Credit with Reputation 
Any credit arrangement necessitates some degree of cooperation between a buyer and a 
seller, or a debtor and a creditor. As is well known, cooperation is more easily attainable 
when agents repeatedly interact with one another. Intuitively, with repeated interactions, 
agents are able to develop reputations for behaving appropriately. In this section, we rule 
out the existence of both commitment and public recordkeeping but introduce the no-
tion of reputation by allowing pairs of agents to repeatedly interact with one another via 
a long-term partnership. We do this by assuming that agents who are in a trade match 
during the day can form a partnership that can be maintained beyond the current period. 
That is, agents can continue their trade match or partnership into the next period (day) 
if they so desire.
We allow for both the creation and destruction of a partnership. At the end of each 
period, an existing partnership is destroyed with some probability λ∈(,) . 01  One can 
justify the exogenous destruction of a partnership by supposing that sellers produce dif-
ferent types of goods and buyers only value a subset of these goods. A match destruction 
can be interpreted as an event where the buyer receives a preference shock (at night) 
with the result that he no longer wants to consume the good that the seller produces. In 
this case, the partnership is no longer viable and agents split apart. More generally, agents 
can choose to terminate a partnership at the end of any period. For example, the seller FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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may choose to dissolve the partnership at the end of the period if the buyer does not 
deliver on his promise to produce the general good. This sort of termination is important 
because it provides the seller with a punishment vehicle—namely, the destruction of the 
value asset of an enduring match or partnership—which is required in order to make a 
partnership viable in the ﬁ  rst place.
The chronology of events is as follows. At the beginning of the day, unmatched buy-
ers and sellers participate in a random matching process. Each unmatched agent ﬁ  nds 
a partner with probability σ ; that is, with probability σ  the buyer is matched with a 
seller whose search good he desires to consume. In each match, an allocation (q,y) is 
proposed, which agents can either accept or reject. If both agents accept the offer, the 
seller produces q units of the search good for the buyer in the day. At night, the buyer 
chooses whether or not to produce y units of the general good for the seller. At the end of 
the night, agents decide simultaneously to stay together or to split apart. If either or both 
agents decide to destroy the partnership, then (in equilibrium) their best response will be 
to enter the random matching process at the beginning of the day in order to ﬁ  nd a new 
trading partner. A partnership, which is basically a continuation of a trade match, can only 
be formed during the random matching process at the beginning of the day.
We will characterize the set of symmetric stationary equilibrium allocations for this 
economy. Let et  denote the measure of new trade matches and existing partnerships 
during the day of period t. Assuming that buyers do not renege on their promises, the law 
of motion for et  is
(19)  ee e tt t + =− + −− 1 11 1 () [ () ] . λσ λ
According to (19), if there are et partnerships in period t, a fraction () 1−λ  of them will 
be maintained in period t + 1. Among the 11 −− () λ et  agents who are unmatched at the 
beginning of t + 1, a fraction σ  ﬁ  nd new partners. In the steady state, ee e tt + == 1  which, 










b  be the value function of a buyer who is in a partnership at the beginning of a 
period and Vu
b  the value function of a buyer who is not. Then, assuming that the buyer 
does not defect,  
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 According to (21), the buyer receives q units of search goods in the day and produces y 
units of general goods at night. The partnership is exogenously destroyed with probabil-
ity λ , in which case both the buyer and the seller go to the random matching process at 
the beginning of the day of the next period to ﬁ  nd a new partner. According to (22), an 
unmatched buyer ﬁ  nds a seller who produces a search good that he desires to consume 
with probability σ.
Let Vm
s  be the value function of a seller who is in a partnership at the beginning of the 
period and Vu
s  the value function of a seller who is not. Then, 





s =− + + + − () ( ) , λβ λ β 1





s =+ − σσ β () . 1
According to (23), the seller produces q units of the search good during the day and 
consumes y units of the general good at night. With probability λ  the partnership is dis-
solved, in which case the seller enters the random matching process at the beginning the 
next period. According to (24), the seller is matched with a buyer who likes the search 
good that the seller produces with probability σ.
For (q,y) to be an equilibrium allocation, three sets of conditions have to be satisﬁ  ed. 
First, agents who enter the day search market unmatched, and subsequently become 
matched, will accept the proposed allocation (q,y) if the following (participation) con-
straints hold,





s () ( ) , λβ λ β β 1





b () ( ) , −+ +− ≥ λβ λ β β 1
If the seller and buyer accept the allocation (q,y), then their expected payoffs are 
given by the left-hand sides of (25) and (26), respectively. If, however, the allocation is 
rejected, the continuation payoffs are given by the right-hand sides of (25) and (26), 
respectively. Second, if the buyer does not receive a preference shock, then a matched 
buyer and the seller will agree to continue their partnership if





s () ( ) , λβ λ β 1





b () ( ) . −+ +− ≥ λβ λ β 1
If the seller and the buyer choose to continue the partnership, their payoffs at the begin-
ning of the subsequent period are given by the left-hand sides of (27) and (28), respec-
tively. If the seller and buyer choose to dissolve the partnership, the expected payoffs at 
the beginning of the subsequent period are given by the right-hand sides of (27) and (28), FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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respectively. Clearly, if inequalities (27) and (28) hold, then inequalities (25) and (26), re-
spectively, hold as well. Finally, a buyer in a partnership must be willing to produce the 
general good for the seller at night. This requires that





b λβ λ β β () . 1
If the buyer produces y units of the general good, then his expected payoff is given by the 
left-hand side of (29). If, however, he deviates and does not produce, then the partnership 
will be dissolved at the end of the period and the buyer starts the next day search market 
seeking a new match; the utility associated with this outcome is given by the right-hand 
side of (29).
The set of incentive-feasible allocations that can be sustained by reputations, which 
can be inferred from the value functions (21)–(24) and constraints (27)–(29), is given by   
(30)  A
R qy cq y uq =≤ ≤ − − {( , ): ( ) ( )( ) ( )}. βλ σ 11
Note that inequalities (27) and (28) require that cq y uq () () ≤≤  in order for both 
the seller and the buyer to continue with the partnership. The buyer’s incentive-com-
patibility condition, (29), however, generates the endogenous borrowing constraint 
yu q ≤− − βλ σ () () ( ) . 11  This endogenous borrowing constraint indicates that the max-
imum amount the buyer can promise to repay at night depends on the buyer’s tastes,
β , the stability of the match, λ , and market frictions, σ . The buyer can promise to repay 
more: (i) the more patient he is, i.e., the higher is β ; (ii) the more stable are his prefer-
ences, i.e., the lower is λ ; (iii) the greater is the matching friction, i.e., the lower is σ ; and 
(iv) the higher is his consumption, q, the next day.
Note that from (30), when q > 0, the set of incentive-feasible allocations, A
R, is empty 
when all matches are destroyed at the end of a period, i.e., when λ =1,  or when an agent 
can ﬁ  nd a partner in the day market with certainty, i.e., when σ =1. The existence of 
credit relationships relies on the threat of termination, but such a threat has bite only if 
matches, for exogenous reasons, are not destroyed with high probability or if it is difﬁ  cult 
to create a new trade match.
From (30), the efﬁ  cient production and consumption level of the search good, q*, is 
implementable if and only if
(31)  cq uq (* ) ( ) ( )(* ) . ≤− − βλ σ 11
Agents are able to trade the quantity q *  through long-term partnerships if the average 
duration of a long-term partnership is high, i.e., if λ  is low, and if the matching frictions 
are severe, i.e., if σ  is low.POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 12, DECEMBER 2005
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Related Literature 
Pairwise credit in a search-theoretic model was ﬁ  rst introduced by Diamond (1987a,b, 
1990). The environment described by Diamond is similar to that in one of his earlier pa-
per (Diamond, 1982), where agents are matched bilaterally and trade indivisible goods. 
The number of trades is given by a matching function that exhibits increasing returns to 
scale. Diamond allows agents to use lotteries in order to endogenize terms of trade. As in 
our setup credit is repaid with goods. The punishment for not repaying a loan is perma-
nent autarky.
Kocherlakota (1998a,b) describes credit arrangements in different environments, in-
cluding a search-matching model based on a public record of individual transactions. He 
uses mechanism design to characterize the set of symmetric, stationary, incentive-feasible 
allocations. Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998) extends the model to consider the case 
where the public record of individual transactions is updated after a probabilistic lag. 
They establish that society’s welfare increases as the frequency with which the public 
record is updated increases. As pointed out by Wallace (2000), this is the ﬁ  rst model that 
formalizes the idea according to which technological advances in the payment system im-
prove welfare. The model by Kocherlakota and Wallace has been extended by Shi (2001) 
to discuss how the degree of advancement of the credit system affects specialization.
Most search-theoretic models of the labor market assume long-term partnerships. A 
canonical model is provided by Pissarides (2000). However, in these economies, trades do 
not involve credit and are free of moral hazard considerations. Corbae and Ritter (2004) 
consider an economy with pairwise meetings where agents can form long-term partner-
ships to sustain credit arrangements. A related model of reciprocal exchange is also pre-
sented by Kranton (1996).
Aiyagari and Williamson (1999) consider a random-matching model in which agents 
receive random endowments that are private information. Exchange is motivated by risk-
sharing. The social planner designs the optimal dynamic contract. It acts as a ﬁ  nancial in-
termediary that opens accounts for the different agents. Optimal allocations have several 
features similar to those of real-world credit arrangements, including credit balances and 
credit limits.
Pure Monetary Economies 
In the previous section, credit arrangements could be sustained because agents could 
commit to repay their debt, observe a record of other agents’ trades, or were able to form 
enduring relationships. In this section, we assume that none of these options is possible. 
As a result, trade cannot be mediated by credit, and some alternative payments instru-
ment must emerge if trade is ever to occur. The payments instrument that we consider 
here is ﬁ  at money, which is a durable but intrinsically useless object. Fiat money is essen-FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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tial to the economy in the sense that its existence allows buyers and sellers to trade with 
one another; the introduction of ﬁ  at money generates (desirable) outcomes that would 
not be possible in its absence.
The economic environment is the benchmark model. During the day, buyers and sell-
ers are randomly matched; in a trade match, the seller produces the search good for the 
buyer. We will consider two versions of the night market. The ﬁ  rst version enables us to 
compare money economies with credit economies. In this version, buyers and sellers 
who are matched in the day can continue their relationship at night; at the end of the pe-
riod, all matches are dissolved. This setup is similar to that of the credit economies in the 
previous section. The second version of the night market is a more “standard” setup for 
models of money. In this version, matches are destroyed at the end of the day, and at night 
there exists a competitive market where all agents can trade money for the general good.
Money Is Memory 
How does a monetary economy compare with a credit economy in terms of the set of 
allocations that can be implemented? To address this question, we structure a monetary 
economy to mirror a credit economy when public recordkeeping is possible.
At the beginning of time, each buyer is endowed with one unit of an indivisible and 
durable object, ﬁ  at money, that is intrinsically useless. The sequence of events in a typical 
period is as follows: At the beginning of the day, buyers and sellers are matched pairwise 
and at random. In each trade match, an allocation (q,dam) is proposed where q is the 
amount of search good that the seller produces, and dam is the transfer of one unit of 
money from the buyer to the seller. The allocation can depend on the money balances 
of the buyer and seller in the match. The buyer and the seller in a trade match simultane-
ously accept or reject the offer. If one of the agents rejects the offer, then the match is 
dissolved; otherwise, the trade takes place and agents remain matched into the night. At 
night, an allocation (y,dpm) is proposed where y is the amount of the general good that is 
produced by the buyer for the seller and dpm is the money transfer from the seller to the 
buyer. The matched agents decide simultaneously on whether to accept or reject this al-
location. If it is accepted by both agents, then it is implemented. At the end of the period, 
all matches are dissolved.
We will consider allocations such that all buyers at the beginning of each period hold 
one unit of money. This guarantees that whenever a buyer is matched with a seller, he 
is able to trade. If matched buyers and sellers follow their equilibrium strategies of ac-
cepting the proposed (incentive-feasible) allocations and producing output for one unit 
of money, then buyers will, in fact, always begin each period with one unit of money in 
hand and sellers with no units of money. The mechanism that we consider is such that 
if a matched buyer does not hold one unit of money at the beginning of the period, or, 
if the seller holds more than zero units of money, then the proposed allocation will be POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 12, DECEMBER 2005
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(q,dam) = (0,0); and if the seller does not hold exactly one unit of money at night, then 
the proposed allocation is (y,dpm) = (0,0). If any one of these circumstances arises, it 
necessarily implies that in the past, an agent departed from equilibrium play. Hence, an 
agent’s money holdings reveal if he behaved according to the proposed allocation in the 
past.
The value function of a buyer holding one unit of money at the beginning of the day is
(32)  Vu q y V
bb () ( ) () . 11 =− [] + σβ
 According to (32), the buyer meets a seller with probability σ. If this event occurs, then 
the buyer will consume q units of the search good in exchange for his unit of money. 
At night the buyer gets his unit of money back in exchange for y units of the general 
good. If the buyer does not hold money, the mechanism proposes no trade and, therefore, 
V
b() . 00 =  (Alternatively, the mechanism could allow the buyer to get his money back if 
it proposes an allocation that has  yV
b = β () , 1  which implies that V
b() ) . 00 =
The value function of a seller holding zero units of money at the beginning of a 
period is
(33)  Vc q y V
ss () () () . 00 =− + [] + σβ
According to (33), a seller meets a buyer with probability σ.  In the event a trade match 
occurs, the seller produces q units of the search good for the buyer in exchange for one 
unit of money.  At night the seller gives the unit of money back to the buyer in exchange 
for y units of the general good. If the seller holds a different amount than zero at the be-
ginning of a period, he cannot trade and, therefore, Vm
s() = 0 for m > 0,  i.e., in this situ-
ation, the mechanism will propose the offer (0,0).
For the allocations {(q,1),(y,1)} to be incentive-feasible, agents must be willing to 
participate in a trade. This requires
(34)  uq y V V
bb ( ) () () , −+ ≥ ββ 11
(35)  −+ + ≥ cq y V V
ss () () () , ββ 00
(36)  −+ ≥ yV V
bb ββ () () , 10
(37)  yV V
ss +≥ ββ () () . 01
Conditions (34) and (35) require the buyer and the seller, respectively, to accept the trade 
during the day, while conditions (36) and (37) require the buyer and the seller, respective-
ly, to accept the trade at night. Conditions (34) and (35) imply that cq y uq () () , ≤≤  i.e., 
the buyer and seller surpluses from trade must be non-negative. Clearly, condition (37) is FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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satisﬁ  ed whenever (35) holds. Finally, condition (36), in conjunction with the value func-
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The set of incentive-feasible allocations in the monetary economy is identical to the set of 
incentive-feasible allocations in a credit economy with a public record, i.e., AA
MP R = , 
where the set A
PR  is described in (14). In this sense, money is equivalent to a public re-
cordkeeping mechanism, i.e., money is memory.  The explanation for this result is as fol-
lows. The money balances of an agent are a state variable that conveys some information 
about his past trading behavior. The money balances of an agent indicate whether he has 
defected from a given allocation by not producing for his trading partner when it was his 
turn to produce. Money here can also be interpreted as a license to consume or as collat-
eral. The buyer who transfers his unit of money to the seller knows that he won’t be able 
to consume in future periods if he does not get his unit of money back at night.
Indivisible Money and Currency Shortage 
We now assume that matches are dissolved at the end of the day. As well, we will also 
impose a speciﬁ  c pricing mechanism for both search goods and general goods. During 
the day, the terms of trade in bilateral matches are determined according to a bargaining 
process. We assume that the buyer has all of the bargaining power and makes a take-it-or-
leave-it offer to the seller.  At night, we assume that the market for general goods is com-
petitive, where price-taking agents can buy and sell units of money in exchange for gen-
eral goods at the market-clearing price, φ , where φ  represents how many general goods 
can be purchased at night for one unit of money.  As is typically the case for Walrasian mar-
kets, the way in which agents meet or trades actually take place is not made explicit. Since 
agents trade with “the market,” they are anonymous to one another; i.e., agents who pur-
chase goods do not know which agents produced them, and agents who receive money 
do not know which agent previously held the money. This anonymity precludes the use 
of credit arrangements in the general goods market.
Regarding the quantity of money in the economy, we assume that M < 1. This implies 
that not all buyers can be endowed with money: There is a currency shortage. The reason 
that we investigate this case is twofold. First, currency shortages were common until the POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 12, DECEMBER 2005
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mid-ninteenth century and they can be captured by this assumption. Second, this assump-
tion was used in the early search-theoretic literature of money for tractability purposes.
The value function for a buyer holding m units of money at the beginning of the pe-
riod satisﬁ  es
(40)
 
Vm u q Wmd Wm
b
qd Om
bb () m a x ( ) ( ) ( ) () ,
(,) ( )
=+ − {} +−
∈
σσ 1
where O(m) is the set of offers that are acceptable by sellers and that are feasible given 
the money balances of the buyer, and Wb is the value function of a buyer at the beginning 
of the night. According to (40), a buyer with money at the beginning of the day is random-
ly matched with a seller with probability σ . In a trade match, he consumes q units of the 
search good and delivers d units of money to the seller, where both  q and d are chosen 
optimally in the set of acceptable offers. The value function of a buyer in the Walrasian 
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(42)  s.t.  xm ym += + φφ ˆ .
The budget constraint (42) simply says that the buyer ﬁ  nances his end-of-period money 
balances,  ˆ m, and consumption, x, with production of the general good, y, and with mon-
ey balances brought into the night, m. Substituting x – y from the budget identity (42) 
into the maximand of (41) we obtain
(43)
 
Wm m m Vm
b
m
b () m a x { () } . =+ − + φφ β ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
Note that equation (43) tells us that the buyer’s choice of end-of-period money balanc-
es,  ˆ m, is independent of the money balances brought in from the day, m. This comes 
from the linearity of the utility function that eliminates wealth effects. Furthermore, it is 
straightforward to see that Wm mW
bb () ( ) . =+ φ 0
Sellers spend all of their money balances at night in the general goods market since 
they do not require money in order to trade in the morning search market, and it is costly 
to hold money balances in the morning search market. Hence, the value function for a 
seller at the beginning of the period is given by
(44)
 
Vc q d d F q d V
ss =− + + ∫ σφ β [( ) ]( , ) ,
where F(q,d) is the distribution of offers made by buyers, which depends on the distri-
bution of money balances across buyers. According to the value function (44), the seller FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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is matched to a buyer with probability σ , and the offer (q,d) is a random draw from the 
distribution F(q,d).
A seller in a trade match will accept the offer (q,d) if it satisﬁ  es −+ +≥ cq d V V
ss () . φβ β 
Consequently, the set of offers the buyer with m units of money can make, O(m), is 
given by
Om qd cq d d m ( ) {( , ): ( ) , }. =− + ≥ ≤ φ 0
 The buyer will extract all of the surplus in the trade match, which implies that the buy-
er’s offer (q,d) will satisfy
(45)  −+ = cq d () . φ 0
Equations (44) and (45) imply that V
s = 0, and equations (40) and (45) may be 
rearranged to read
Vm u c d d Wm
b
dm
b () m a x ( ) () .
{, , }







Substituting this expression for Vb(m) into the buyer’s value function at the beginning of 
the night, equation (43), the buyer’s problem, can be re-expressed more compactly as
(46)
 
max max ( ) ,
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where r =− () / . 1 ββ  Equation (46) has a simple interpretation. The buyer faces a trade-
off when determining his money holdings: There is a cost associated with holding real 
balances, which is equal to agents’ rate of time preference; the cost of bringing  ˆ m bal-
ances into the next period is rm φ ˆ. But there is also a beneﬁ  t associated with holding real 
balances, which is equal to the expected surplus that is obtained in the search market; 
the expected surplus is given by σφ [() ] . uq d −  Since r > 0, it is easy to check from (46) 
that buyers will not hold more money than they expect to spend if they are matched in 
the search market; this implies that dm = ˆ  and cq m () . =φ ˆ
If money were perfectly divisible, the buyer’s maximization problem (46) would have 
a unique solution. However, because money is indivisible, this solution may not be attain-
able. It can be checked that (46) has, at most, two solutions which are two consecutive 
integers. Furthermore, since M, the quantity of money per buyer, is less than one, market-
clearing implies that buyers must be indifferent between holding 0 or 1 unit of money. 
Therefore,  ˆ m =1 and, from problem (46),
(47)  ru q φσ φ =− {() } .POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 12, DECEMBER 2005
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An equilibrium in this environment is the quantity of search goods produced,  q, that sat-
isﬁ  es (48). Given our assumptions about c and u, it is easy to check that there exists a 
unique q > 0 that satisﬁ  es (48).
Let us turn to a comparative static analysis of the purchasing power of money as fun-
damentals change. From (48), ∂∂ > q/ σ 0 and ∂∂ < qr /. 0  As the matching probability σ  
increases, a buyer has a higher chance to trade during the day, which makes money more 
valuable. As a consequence, the quantities traded increase. As the rate of time preference, 
r, increases, agents become more impatient, and the cost of holding money increases. As 
a consequence, the value of money falls, and agents trade less. Note that the purchasing 
power of money is independent of M, the quantity of money in the economy.
If we measure social welfare by the sum of utilities of buyers and sellers, then 
WM u q c q =− σ [ ( ) ( )]. Here money is not neutral and an increase in M, for  M ∈(,) , 01
raises welfare by increasing the number of trades in the economy. Hence, a change in M 
has no effect on the intensive margin, which is the quantity produced in a particular 
trade match, but affects the extensive margin, which is the number of trade matches. We 
will see later how this extensive margin result disappears when money is assumed to be 
perfectly divisible.
Depending on the precise functional form of u and c and the values of β and σ , the 
equilibrium value of the amount of search goods produced, q, can be greater than, less 
than, or equal to the efﬁ  cient level, q *. Hence, a problem associated with the indivisibil-
ity of money is that sometimes the amount of search goods produced, q, is greater than 
what is socially efﬁ  cient, q *. This can easily be seen from (48), if we assume that r ≈ 0.
Indivisible Money and Lotteries 
When money is indivisible, there are circumstances under which the buyer could be 
made better off if he could somehow give up only a fraction of his money balances to 
the seller; this happens when  qq > *. Before turning to the case of perfectly divisible 
money, we show that there is a way to achieve this outcome when money is indivisible 
by introducing lotteries over the outcome (q,d), d∈{,} . 01  Since there is no (social) ben-
eﬁ  t associated with having a lottery over output, the take-it-or-leave-it offer by the buy-
er of the search good can be described by (,) , q τ  where q is the amount of the search 
good produced by the seller, and τ  is the probability that the buyer surrenders his unit 
of money to the seller.
Consider a trade match between a buyer and a seller. As above, equilibrium in the gen-
eral goods market will require that buyers hold either zero or one unit of money at the FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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end of the period. In a trade match, the take-it-or-leave-it offer that the buyer makes to the 
seller, (,) , q τ  solves the problem
(49)
 




τφ τφ τ −− + ≥ ≤ ≤      s.t.      and     00 1
The solution is qq = *  and τφ τ =≤ cq (* ) / ;   if   1  otherwise τ =1 and qq < *  satisﬁ  es 
(48). The solution to the buyer’s choice of money balances to bring into the next peri-
od—where the problem is now described by (46), except that φd  is replaced by τφd—
is given by
(50)  ru q φσ τ φ =− [() ] ,
which is a modiﬁ  ed version of equation (47). An expression for τ  can be obtained by 





















Hence,  qq =≤ *  iff τ 1 and, from equation (51),τσ σ ≤≤ + 1 iff cq uq r (* ) (* ) / ( ) .  So if 
allocation  (* ,(* ) ) qc q  is incentive-feasible in the “money is memory” environment (see 
the  section on Money is Memory and the deﬁ  nition of A
M  in [39]) or in a credit envi-
ronment with public recordkeeping (see the section on Credit with Public Recordkeep-
ing and the deﬁ  nition of A
PR  in [14]), then it can be implemented as an equilibrium in a 
monetary economy with indivisible money by a take-it-or-leave-it offer when buyers can 
use lotteries, i.e., if (* ,(* ) ) , qc q
MP R ∈= AA  then τ ≤1. If τ =1,  then the level of search 
good production, q, is given by equation (48), and qq ≤ *.
Divisible Money 
We now turn to the case where money is perfectly divisible when at night the market 
for general goods is competitive. Since there is no technological constraint that prevents 
the stock of money from being divided evenly across buyers, there can be no shortage 
of currency. In this environment, the buyer’s value functions satisfy (40) and (41), and his 
choice of money balances is still given by (46), but now dm ∈[, ] . 0 ˆ  Since money is cost-
ly to hold, it will be the case that dm = ˆ. Recognizing that the seller’s participation con-
straint will bind, i.e., cq m () , =φ  it will be convenient to rewrite the buyer’s choice of 
money balances problem (46) as  
(52)
 
max{ { [ ( )] [ ( )]}}.
m
rm u qm c qm −+ − φσ ˆˆ ˆ
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since, from the seller’s participation constraint, dq dm c q // ( ) . = ′ φ  It can be checked 
that there is a unique q satisfying (53) and it is such that ∂∂ > q/ σ 0and ∂∂ < qr /. 0  So, 
the comparative static results are similar to those obtained in the model with indivis-
ible money. The term r /σ  is a measure of the cost of holding real balances: this is the 
product of the rate at which agents depreciate future utility, times the average number 
of periods for a match to occur. As this cost increases, buyers reduce their real balances 
and output falls. As the rate of time preference approaches 0, q tends to q *. Finally, M is 
neutral; it affects neither the quantity of search goods produced, q, nor the frequency of 
trades, σ .
Fiat objects, be they divisible or indivisible, can be valued in an environment where 
there is a double-coincidence-of-wants problem and agents cannot use credit. The value 
of money depends on the fundamentals of the economy, including agents’ rate of time 
preference, r, and the extent of the search-matching frictions, σ . When money is per-
fectly divisible, the number of trades is maximized but the quantities traded are too low 
when  r > 0. When money is indivisible and scarce, the number of trades is too low since 
not all buyers can be endowed with money. However, the quantities traded can be too 
high if agents are unable to use lotteries.
Related Literature 
Using a mechanism design approach, Kocherlakota (1998a,b) has established that the 
technological role of money is to act as a societal memory that gives agents access to 
certain aspects of the trading histories of their trading partners. As a corollary, imperfect 
knowledge of individual histories is necessary for money to play an essential role in the 
economy (Wallace, 2000). The recordkeeping role of money was emphasized by Ostroy 
(1973), Ostroy and Starr (1974, 1990) and Townsend (1987, 1989), among others.
Diamond (1984) was the ﬁ  rst to introduce ﬁ  at money into a search-theoretic model 
of bilateral trade. However, money was not essential in Diamond’s environment since all 
matches were double-coincidence-of-wants matches. Kiyotaki and Wright (1989, 1991, 
1993) have introduced a double-coincidence-of-wants problem into a search-theoretic 
environment to explain the emergence of a medium of exchange and the essentiality of 
ﬁ  at money. These models were based on important restrictions: money and goods were 
indivisible and agents could hold at most one unit of an object. Shi (1995) and Trejos and 
Wright (1995) have relaxed the assumption of indivisible goods to endogenize prices. 
Wallace and Zhou (1997) have used a related framework to explain currency shortages. 
Berentsen, Molico, and Wright (2002) have introduced lotteries. The assumption of indi-FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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visible money and its implications for the efﬁ  ciency of monetary exchange are discussed 
in Berentsen and Rocheteau (2002). Search models with divisible money include Shi 
(1997), Green and Zhou (1998), and Lagos and Wright (2004). The formalization adopted 
in this section follows the one in Lagos and Wright.
Alternative models of monetary exchange are surveyed in Wallace (1980) and 
Townsend (1980).
Coexistence of Money and Credit 
Actual economies differ from the pure credit and the pure monetary economies de-
scribed in the previous sections in that many modes of payments coexist. For example, 
some trades are conducted through credit arrangements, while other trades are based on 
monetary exchange. Why do different means of payment coexist? How does the presence 
of monetary exchange affect the use and the availability of credit? How does the availabil-
ity of credit affect the value of money? We address these questions below.
One way to explain the coexistence of monetary exchange and credit arrangements 
is to introduce some heterogeneity among agents and/or trading matches. For example, 
some agents may have the ability to commit to repay their debt or to have their trading 
histories publicly observable, while others don’t. The former set of agents will be able 
to trade using credit arrangements, while the latter set of agents will need to use money. 
In this section, we explain the coexistence of money and credit by introducing heterog-
enous matches: Some matches will be short-lived and last only one period, while other 
matches will be longer-lived and can be productive for many periods. The use of credit 
will not be incentive-feasible in short-lived matches, since the buyer will always default 
on repaying his obligation at night. In contrast, the buyer’s behavior in a long-lived match 
is disciplined by reputation considerations that will trigger the dissolution of a valuable 
relationship following a default.
In this section, we extend the long-term partnership environment described in the 
section on Credit with Reputation by allowing the possibility of short-term partnerships 
to arise. When unmatched agents arrive at the beginning of a period, with probability σ   
they ﬁ  nd a long-term trade match and, with probability σs  they can enter into a short-
term trade match. We assume that 01 <= + < σσ σ   s . A short-term match is destroyed 
with a probability of one at the end of the day, and a long-term match will be destroyed 
exogenously, with probability λ <1 during the night.
The timing of events is as follows: Buyers enter the day market either attached, i.e., in 
a long-term trade match (or partnership), or unattached. Unattached buyers and sellers 
participate in a random matching process. Note that since there is the same number of 
buyers and sellers, there is also the same number of unattached buyers and unattached 
sellers. After the matching process is completed, all matched sellers, i.e., those in either a 
long-term or short-term relationship, produce the search good for buyers. All short-term POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 12, DECEMBER 2005
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matches are destroyed at the end of the day. The night begins with buyers who are in a 
long-term partnership producing the general good for sellers. Buyers then realize a pref-
erence shock, which is followed by the opening of a competitive general goods market, 
where the general good is exchanged for money. As a result of the preference shock, a 
fraction, λ , of long-term trade matches are dissolved.
We assume a speciﬁ  c pricing mechanism for traded goods. For search goods, buy-
ers make take-it-or-leave-it offers to sellers; for general goods, the market is competitive, 
where one unit of money trades for φ  units of the general good.
The aim of this section is to present an environment where money and credit can 
coexist and to see how these two payments systems may affect one another. To this end, 
we will focus on a particular class of equilibria that exhibit two features. First, money is 
valued but is only used in short-term trade matches. Second, the buyer’s incentive-com-
patibility constraint in long-term matches—that the buyer is willing to produce the gen-
eral good for the seller—is not binding. This latter assumption implies that the buyer in 
a long-term trade match can obtain the efﬁ  cient quantity of the search good, q*,without 
having to use any money. At the end of this section, we will brieﬂ  y discuss the implica-
tions of relaxing these assumptions.
Value Functions 
The Bellman equations for the value functions for a buyer assume that the equilibrium 
has money being used in only short-term trade matches. Consider ﬁ  rst a buyer who en-
ters the day market unattached, with m units of money. The value function for such a 
buyer is





b () () ()( ) () , =++ − − σσ σ σ      1
The buyer ﬁ  nds a long-term trade match that has value Vm
b
  ()  with probability σ  ; with 
probability σs , he ﬁ nds a short-term match whose value is Vm s
b() .  The buyer remains 
unattached with probability 1−− σσ   s  and enters the night market with m units of 
money with value Wm u
b() .
Consider ﬁ  rst a buyer holding m units of money who is in a short-term trade match. 
The buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer (qs,ds) to the seller, where qs is the amount 
of the search good that the seller produces and ds is the amount of money transferred 
from the buyer to the seller. Both the seller’s output and the money transfer will depend 
on the money holdings of the buyer. The utility to the buyer in a short-term trade match, 
evaluated in the day, is




s ( ) [ ( )] [ ( )]. =+ −
The buyer will consume qs units of the search good in the day and will enter the com-FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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petitive general goods market with m – ds units of money. The value of the (now un-
matched) buyer at night satisﬁ  es
(56)
 




b ()m a x { ( ) () } . =− + φβ
ˆ
ˆ ˆ
The buyer acquires  ˆ mm −  units of money at the price φ  in terms of general goods at the 
competitive market, in order to readjust his balances to the desired level  ˆ m. Recall that 
x ym m −= − φ() ˆ  and that Wm u
b()  is linear in m, i.e., Wm mW u
b
u
b () ( ) . =+ φ 0
Consider now a buyer who enters the period in a long-term partnership. The buyer 
consumes  q   units of the search good, which is assumed to be independent of money 
balances, m, that he might hold (since we focus on equilibria where the buyer’s incentive-
compatibility constraint in long-term matches is nonbinding). The value function for such 
a buyer at the beginning of the period is
(57)  Vm u q Wm y
bb
       () () (,) , =+
where Wm y
b
   (, )  is the value of the matched buyer at night holding m units of money 
and a promise to produce  y  units of the general good for his partner in the trade match. 
The value function of the matched buyer at night satisﬁ  es
(58)
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At the beginning of the night, the buyer fulﬁ  lls his promise and produces  y  units of the 
general good for the seller. If the trade match is not exogenously destroyed, the buyer con-
sumes his real balances, φm, since money is not needed in a long-term relationship. Alter-
natively, if the partnership breaks up at night, an event that occurs with probability λ , the 
buyer has the opportunity to readjust his money balances in the competitive general goods 
market before he proceeds to the next period in search of a new trading partner. In this 
case, the buyer will choose to bring  ˆ m money balances into the next period. Note from 
(58) that Wm y
b
   (, )  is linear in both m and  y , i.e., Wm y y mW
bb
      (, ) ( , ) . =− + + φ 00
Terms of Trade 
We ﬁ rst examine the amount traded in the case where buyers and sellers are in a short-
term partnership. The buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer, (qs,ds), such that dm s ≤  and 
the seller will accept as long as −+ ≥ cq d ss () . φ 0 As described in the section on Divisi-
ble Money, the offer will be characterized by qm q s() * =  and φdc q = (* )  if φmc q ≥ (* ) ;  
otherwise qc m s =
−1() . φ
The optimal choice of money balances for a buyer who is not in a long-term relation-
ship satisﬁ  es
(59)
 
max{ { [ ( )] [ ( )]}},
m
ss s rm u q m c q m −+ − φσ ˆ
ˆ
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which is identical to problem (52) in the section on Divisible Money and leads to the fa-














For buyers and sellers who are in a long-term partnership, we focus on equilibria 




   (, ) () , ≥  does not bind. When 
this constraint does not bind, a buyer in a long-term relationship proposes (q,y) such 
that  
max[ ( ) ] ( ) ,
, qy
uq y cq y −− − ≥      s.t.    0
which gives qq   = * and  yc q   = (* ) .
Equilibrium 
We consider a steady-state equilibrium where money is only used in short-term matches. 
For an allocation (,,,) qqyy ss     to be an equilibrium, we need to check that the buyer in 
a long-term partnership is willing to repay  y  at night. The incentive-compatibility con-




   (, ) () , ≥  or, from the linearity of the value functions,  




   (, ) () . 00 ≥
With the help of equations (54)–(58), and after some rearranging, inequality (61) can be 
rewritten as
(62)  cq uq uq cq ss s (* ) ( ){ ( )(* ) [( ) ( ) ] } , ≤− − − − 11 λβ σ σ  
where qs satisﬁ  es equation (60). If inequality (62) holds, then there exists an equilibri-
um where buyers and sellers who are in a long-term relationship consume and produce 
qq   = * units of the search good and  yc q   = (* )  units of the general good and use credit 
arrangements to implement these trades. Buyers and sellers in short-term partnerships 
trade qs units of the search good for ys = c(qs) units of real balances.
Perhaps not surprisingly, when σs = 0, the incentive condition (62) is identical to 
the one obtained in a model where money was absent and trade in long-term relation-
ships was supported by reputation (see the deﬁ  nition of A
R  given by [30] in the sec-
tion on Credit with Reputation). So when allocation (* ,(* ) ) , qc q
R ∈A  this allocation 
can be implemented in the long-term relationship—in a world where credit and money 
coexist—as long as σs  is sufﬁ  ciently small. If the frequency of short-term matches, σs , 
increases, then, from (60), agents will increase their real balance holdings; as a result the 
incentive-constraint (62) becomes more difﬁ  cult to satisfy. Hence, the availability of mon-FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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etary exchange in the presence of a long-term partnership increases the attractiveness of 
defaulting on promised performance.
In this section, we have only described one type of equilibrium, where money is not 
needed in long-term trade matches. There exist other kinds of equilibria when the incen-
tive-constraint (61) binds. In those equilibria, agents will use money in both short-term 
and long-term trade matches, but fewer money balances will be needed in long-term 
relationships. In these kinds of equilibria, money can be used to weaken the buyer’s 
incentive-compatibility constraint. Hence, payment in long-term trade matches be will a 
combination of money and a promise to repay output in the future.
Finally, an interesting extension of this model would consist of introducing money 
growth in order to investigate how inﬂ  ation affects the buyer’s incentive-compatibility 
constraint, that is, in a long-term relationship. We conjecture the following: As inﬂ  ation 
increases, the cost of holding real balances is higher and, as a consequence, the amount 
of search good traded in a short-term trade match, qs, decreases. Hence, buyers obtain a 
smaller surplus in short-term trade matches which raises the cost of defaulting in long-
term trade matches. If the incentive-compatibility constraint (61) is binding, inﬂ  ation 
would relax this constraint, although it would also reduce the quantities traded in short-
term matches. Depending on the relative magnitudes, it is possible that a mild inﬂ  ation 
can deliver a better outcome than a zero inﬂ  ation. If, however, one allows for negative 
money growth rates, i.e., deﬂ  ation, then the cost of holding real balances can be driven to 
zero, which implies that all trades can be conducted with money and this generates the 
efﬁ  cient allocation.
Related Literature 
Shi (1996) has constructed a search-theoretic environment where ﬁ  at money and cred-
it can coexist, even though money is dominated by credit in the rate of return. A credit 
trade occurs when two agents are matched and the buyer in the match does not have 
money. Collateral is used to make the repayment incentive-compatible, and debt is repaid 
with money. In this approach, monetary exchange is superior to credit in the sense that 
monetary exchange allows agents to trade faster. Li (2001) extended Shi’s model to allow 
private debt to circulate and to investigate various government policies including open-
market operations and public-debt policies.
Townsend (1989) investigates the optimal trading mechanism in an economy with 
different locations, where some agents stay in the same location while other agents move 
from one location to another. The optimal arrangement implies the coexistence of cur-
rency and credit. Currency is used between strangers, i.e., agents whose histories are 
not known to one another, and credit is used among agents who know their histories. 
Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998) consider a random-matching economy with a public 
record of all past transactions that is updated only infrequently. They show that in this POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 12, DECEMBER 2005
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economy there are roles for both monetary transactions and some form of credit. Jin and 
Temzelides (2004) consider a search-theoretic model with local and faraway trades. There 
is recordkeeping at the local level so that agents in local meetings can trade with credit. 
In contrast, agents from different neighborhoods need to trade with money.
Corbae and Ritter (2004) consider a model of long-term and short-term partnerships 
similar to the one presented in this section. It is shown that the presence of money 
weakens incentive-compatibility conditions. Aiygari and Williamson (2000) construct a 
dynamic risk-sharing model where agents can enter into a long-term relationship with a 
ﬁ  nancial intermediary. They introduce a transaction role for money by assuming random 
limited participation in the ﬁ  nancial market. In each period, agents can defect from their 
long-term contracts and trade in a competitive money market in each succeeding period. 
Aiyagari and Williamson show that the value of this outside option depends on monetary 
policy.
Alternative Media of Exchange 
We have examined economies where credit and ﬁ  at money are used as means of pay-
ment. Even though, in practice, ﬁ  at money plays a singular role in facilitating transactions, 
a large variety of assets and commodities can be and are used as means of payment. For 
example, real commodities, such as gold and silver, capital or claims on capital, govern-
ment securities, and foreign currencies, to name but a few, have been known to be used 
to purchase goods. A number of interesting questions naturally arise. Is money useful 
when capital can be used as a medium of exchange? Is it useful to have several curren-
cies and how are exchange rates determined? Can money and interest-bearing bonds co-
exist?
We will now study economies where agents can choose among different media of 
exchange: money and something else. We will draw conclusions regarding the possibility 
and the need of having different payment instruments simultaneously circulating.
Money and Capital 
A direct way for a buyer in our model to obtain the search good would be to give the 
seller what he values: the general good. This direct method of payment, however, is tech-
nically infeasible in the benchmark model since it is assumed that goods fully depreciate 
at the end of the subperiod in which they are produced. The general good is produced 
at night and cannot carried over to the next period to pay for a search good. In what fol-
lows, we relax the assumption that all goods are perishable.
The economic environment is that of the benchmark model, except that the general 
good can be stored. Trade matches are destroyed at the end of the day, and the market for 
the general good is competitive. We consider an economy where agents have access to a 
storage technology that enables them to carry over the general good from one period to FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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the next. The storage technology is linear, which means that each unit of stored general 
good generates  A≥ 0 units of the general good in the following period. More speciﬁ  cally, 
if a unit of the general good is stored at night, then it turns into A units of the general 
good the next morning; the A units can be held over the day and consumed (or stored) in 
the subsequent night. The case where A = 0 corresponds to the assumption that goods 
are perishable, while the case where A = 1 corresponds to a pure storage technology. 
If A > 1, then the storage technology is productive, whereas if A < 1, the storage tech-
nology is characterized by depreciation. For convenience, we will refer to a good that is 
stored as capital.
Consider a buyer holding a portfolio (m,k) of money and capital at the beginning of 
the day. This portfolio implies that the buyer stored k/A units of the general good from the 
previous night. We denote (q,dm,dk) as the terms of trade in a bilateral match where q is 
the amount of the search good that the buyer receives from the seller, dm is the transfer 
of money from the buyer to the seller, and dk is the transfer of capital from the buyer to 
the seller. The buyer’s lifetime expected utility satisﬁ  es
(63)  V mk uqmk W m d mk k d mk W mk
bb
mk
b (, ) { [ (, ) ] ( (, ) , (, ) ) }( ) (, ) . =+ − − + − σσ 1
According to (63), a buyer who meets a seller consumes q units of the search good 
and transfers dm units of money and dk units of capital to the seller. The terms of trade   
(q,dm,dk) depend on the buyer’s initial portfolio. The utility of the buyer at night obeys  
(64)
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since, from the buyer’s budget constraint,  xy m mkk −= − − +− φφ ˆ ˆ. Note that the val-
ue function for the buyer at the beginning of the next period depends upon Ak units of 
goods.
The terms of trade in bilateral matches are determined by take-it-or-leave-it offers by 
buyers. An optimal offer for the buyer solves
(65) 
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The solution to this bargaining problem is qmk q (, ) * =  and φddc q mk += (* )  if 
φmkc q +≥ (* ) ;  otherwise qc mk =+
−1() . φ  Notice that it is the real value of the  entire 
portfolio, φmk + , that is relevant to determining the terms of trade and not the compo-
sition of the portfolio.
If we substitute the buyer’s beginning-of-period lifetime utility, Vb, given by (63), into 
buyer’s beginning-of-night lifetime utility, Wb, given by (64), recognizing that the buyer POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 12, DECEMBER 2005
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extracts all of the surplus from a trade match, the buyer’s choice for the optimal portfolio 
can be expressed as

































The expression in the brackets should look familiar: The ﬁ  rst two terms represent the 
cost of carrying money and capital, respectively, into the subsequent period, and the third 
term represents the expected surplus that is obtained in a trade match. Since the quantity 
of search goods proposed in the bargain, q(m,k), depends only on the real value of the 
buyer’s portfolio, φmk + , buyers will be willing to hold both money and capital if and 
only if they both offer the same return, i.e., if and only if  A = 1. If A > 1, capital domi-
nates money in its rate of return and agents will hold only capital goods to make transac-















Note that the quantity of search goods traded in bilateral matches increases with the rate 
of return of capital. As the rate of return of capital approaches the discount rate, i.e., as 
Aβ  approaches one, the quantity traded, q, approaches its efﬁ  cient value, q *. If A < 1, 
then capital generates a lower rate of return than money and, as a result, buyers will hold 
only money for transaction purchases in equilibrium, i.e., buyers will not store any of the 
general good.
Let us return to the case of a pure storage technology, i.e., A = 1, so that money and 
capital can coexist as a means of payments. The quantities of goods traded will be identi-
cal to the quantities traded in the monetary economy studied in the previous section. 
However, the presence of money is welfare-improving because it frees up real resources 
for alternative uses: Capital that was previously used as a medium of exchange can now 
be consumed. This is a standard argument in favor of a ﬁ  at money regime rather than a 
commodity standard.
As it now stands, the model cannot explain how capital and money can coexist if capi-
tal dominates money in its rate of return. A crude way to obtain coexistence is to impose 
costs on the use of capital as a medium of exchange. For example, productive capital 
may be costly to use as a medium of exchange because it is not as easy to transport as 
money, or because claims on capital may be easier to forge than ﬁ  at money. Hence, if the   
net return to capital—net of transportation or expected forgery costs—equals one, then 
money and capital can coexist. An alternative approach to obtain coexistence is based 
on the existence of legal restrictions. Suppose that there exists a government that wants FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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to promote the use of ﬁ  at money. The government can promote the use of ﬁ  at money 
by refusing to accept capital for any transactions with private agents. To the extent that 
agents want to or have to transact with the government, they will then want to hold some 
of the (lower rate of return) money. Here, the lower return on money is compensated by 
its higher “liquidity.”
Dual-Currency Payment Systems 
Real economies are endowed with many different currencies. We now examine the co-
existence of two monies to see whether two currencies can be valued and used in pay-
ments. We also want to determine whether there are gains in having more than one cur-
rency. Our investigation here is slightly different from that of the previous section. The 
previous section examined the coexistence of a ﬁ  at money and a real object; this section 
examines the coexistence of two ﬁ  at monies.
We now turn to an economy where two ﬁ   at monies—called money 1 and 
money 2—can be used as mediums of exchange. We assume that the stocks of both 
monies, M1 and M2 , are constant and that agents are free to use any currency in a trade. 
The market for general goods is competitive, where one unit of money 1 buys φ1 units of 
the general good and one unit of money 2 buys φ2 units of the general good.
Consider a buyer holding m1  units of currency 1 and m2  units of currency 2. His be-
ginning-of-period value function, Vb(m1,m2), satisﬁ  es
(68)
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The interpretation of the value function (68) is similar to that of the value function 
Vb(m,k) given in (63). The value function of the buyer at night is given by
(69)
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and the interpretation of this value function is similar to that of Wb(m,k) given in (64).
The terms of trade are determined by take-it-or-leave-it offers by buyers. It is straightfor-
ward to show (and should come as no surprise) that the solution to the buyer’s bargain-
ing problem is given by qq = *  and φφ 11 22 dd c q += (* )  if φφ 11 22 mm c q +≥ (* ) ;  other-
wise qc m m =+
−1
11 22 () . φφ As in the previous section, the terms of trade depend only on 
the real value of the whole portfolio of the buyer. Substituting Vb, given by its expression 
in (68), into (69), and using the solution for the buyer’s bargaining problem, the buyer’s 
optimal portfolio satisﬁ  es
(70)
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Since  q(m1,m2) depends only on the real value of the buyer’s portfolio, φφ 11 22 mm + , 
(70) does not pin down the composition of the portfolio. The buyer is indifferent be-
tween holding one currency or another. The buyers-take-all assumption implies that
(71)  cq m m () ; =+ φφ 11 22












While equation (72) uniquely determines the value of q, equation (71) is effectively left to 
determine both φ1 and φ2. Equivalently, for any exchange rate ε , there exists a price for 
money 2, φε 21 2 =+ cq M M () / [ ] ,  that solves (71). Consequently, the nominal exchange 
rate εφφ = 12 /  is indeterminate.
The indeterminacy of the exchange rate can be resolved if the government simply 
imposes a certain exchange rate when trading with private agents. The government can 
implicitly impose an exchange rate by refusing to accept one of the monies in trades 
with private agents. Assume, for example, that the government will only accept the ﬁ  rst 
currency. Then buyers will only want to hold the ﬁ  rst currency, and the second currency 
will lose its value, φ2 0 = . Finally, it turns out that multiple currencies are not useful in 
this economy since the equilibrium allocation is the same as the one in the single cur-
rency economy. That is, agents trade the same quantities q in all matches, irrespective of 
the number of currencies.
Government Liabilities as Means of Payment 
In real economies, ﬁ  nancial institutions (e.g., banks) whose liabilities are used by private 
agents as mediums of exchange (deposit and saving accounts) hold government secu-
rities. This phenomenon reﬂ  ects an intermediation activity on the part of the ﬁ  nancial 
institution consisting of transforming illiquid assets into more liquid ones. We will now 
describe economies where agents hold government bonds and ﬁ  at money. We will inves-
tigate whether government bonds that pay interest can be used as a means of payment. 
This discussion will require that we formalize the notion of illiquid bonds. We will con-
clude with a discussion on whether illiquid assets have a role to play in the economy.
Consider an economy where agents can use both money and government bonds as 
mediums of exchange. A one-period government bond is issued at night and is redeemed 
for one unit of money in the night market of the subsequent period. Government bonds 
are of the pure discount variety and are perfectly divisible, payable to the bearer, and 
default-free. (These assumptions make money and bonds close substitutes.) The ﬂ  ow of 
bonds sold by the government each period is equal to B. The government ﬁ  nances the 
interest payments on bonds, if any, by lump-sum taxation at the end of each period.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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Since matured bonds are exchanged for money one to one, the price of matured bonds, 
in terms of night goods, is φ . Let ω  be the price of newly-issued bonds in terms of night 
commodities. If ωφ < , newly-issued bonds are sold at a discount for money. The one-pe-
riod rate of return on newly issued bonds rb =− φω /. 1
Can newly issued bonds ever be sold at a discount? If bonds were sold at a discount 
for money, then agents would prefer to sell all their money for bonds, since bonds are as 
liquid as money but provide a rate of return. (A standard backward-induction argument 
would generalize this result to the case where the length of the maturity period is more 
than one period.) So, in equilibrium, money and newly issued bonds are perfect substi-
tutes, i.e., ωφ = . This result is then similar to the dual-currency economy of the section 
on Terms of Trade, where the exchange rate between the two currencies is unity and the 
two nominal assets are traded at par. Hence, interest-bearing government bonds cannot 
coexist with ﬁ  at money unless one assumes some form of illiquidity associated with gov-
ernment bonds.
We introduce an arbitrary restriction on the use of bonds in bilateral meetings during 
the day in order to generate a form of illiquidity for bonds. A buyer holding a portfolio 
of b units of bonds can use only a fraction  g∈[,] 01 of his bonds to make a payment in 
a bilateral match during the day. If g = 0, bonds are fully illiquid, whereas if g = 1, they 
are perfectly liquid. One can interpret this illiquidity of bonds as stemming from the fact 
that bonds are not as easily transportable as money, are not perfectly divisible, or involve 
costs to be recognized. One can also view this constraint as an arbitrary form of a cash-in-
advance requirement. Since terms of trade are determined by take-it-or-leave-it offers by 
buyers, the quantities traded in bilateral matches during the day satisfy  
cq m g b () ( ) , =+ φ
which is the seller’s participation constraint.
The value function for buyers, Vb(m,b), which is similar to (68), can be expressed as  
Vm b u q m b Wmdbd Wm b
bb
mb
b ( ,) {[( ,) ] ( , ) } ( ) ( ,) , =+ − − + − σσ 1
where  
Wm b mb m b Vm b
b
mb
b (, ) ( )m a x , ,
,
= + + −−+ () {} φφ ω β ˆ
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ
and dm(dg) represents the transfer of money (bonds) from the buyer to the seller in the 
morning. The buyer’s portfolio problem is given by the solution to
m a x ( ) { [( ,) [( ,) ] .
, mb
b br r m r u qmb cqmb −− −+ − {} ωφ σ ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
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Equating the right-hand sides of (73) and (74), so that buyers are indifferent between 











The one-period rate of return on government bonds depends on the degree of liquidity 
of bonds. If bonds are perfectly liquid, i.e., g = 1, then rb = 0 and ωφ = . If bonds are il-
liquid, i.e., g = 0, then  rb = r.
An alternative way to formalize legal restrictions is to describe the government as 
a subset of sellers in the economy whose trading behaviors are speciﬁ  ed exogenously. 
Government agents refuse to accept government bonds in payment and can also inﬂ  u-
ence terms of trade by choosing the price at which it will sell its output. In general, the 
interest rate on government bonds would depend on the size of the government, i.e., the 
fraction of sellers who are government agents, as well as the government’s trading policy, 
i.e., the price of its output. We can rationalize the coexistence of interest-bearing bonds 
and money if bonds are illiquid. But so far we have not explained why bonds should be 
illiquid: The presence of illiquid bonds does not generate better allocations.
In order for government bonds to pay interest, they must be illiquid. And, up to this 
point, we have arbitrarily imposed a form of illiquidity on bonds. But why should bonds 
be illiquid? An interesting way to justify the illiquidity of bonds is to show that their 
presence can, in fact, raise society’s welfare. To make this point, the environment can be 
modiﬁ  ed as follows: Suppose that each period is divided into three subperiods; the early 
morning, the day, and the night. The day and night are as before. During the early morning, 
however, buyers receive a preference shock: with some probability they want to con-
sume, and with the complement probability they do not want to consume. The buyer’s 
portfolio of money and bonds is chosen at night, before the buyer knows whether he will 
want to consume the next period, and buyers are allowed to readjust their portfolios in 
the early morning after they receive their preference shock. If bonds are perfectly liquid, 
there is no reason to trade money for bonds in the early morning, since they are perfect 
substitutes. If bonds are made illiquid, however, buyers will have an incentive to reallo-
cate their portfolios in the early morning. Buyers with a positive preference shock will FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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sell bonds to be able to consume more during the day, while buyers with a negative pref-
erence shock will buy bonds that pay interest. An alternative interpretation of this result 
is as follows. Buyers with a positive preference shock would like to borrow from buyers 
with a negative shock. Since they cannot commit to repay their debts, the (private) loan 
market is inactive. In contrast to private agents, the government can commit to pay off in 
the future. Therefore, instead of selling their own debt, buyers with a positive preference 
shock sell the government’s debt and buyers with a negative shock buy it.
Related Literature 
Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) constructed an environment where all commodities can 
serve as means of payment and where agents can choose which one to use. Models of 
commodity monies include Sargent and Wallace (1983), Burdett and Wright (2001), Vel-
de, Weber, and Wright (1999), and Li (2003). The existence of a monetary equilibrium 
when agents have access to a linear storage technology was studied by Wallace (1980) 
in the context of an overlapping-generations model. Lagos and Rocheteau (2004) stud-
ied how money and capital can compete as means of payment in a search environment. 
Shi (1999), Aruoaba and Wright (2003), and Aruoba, Waller, and Wright (2004) described 
search economies where agents can accumulate capital but capital is illiquid, in the sense 
that it cannot be used as a means of payment in bilateral matches.
The ﬁ  rst search-theoretic environment with two currencies was proposed by Mat-
suyama, Kiyotaki, and Matsui (1993) and was extended by Zhou (1997) to allow for cur-
rency exchange. They considered a two-country economy where the two countries are 
imperfectly integrated and establish conditions on parameters under which one currency 
is used as an international currency. They also showed that a uniform currency dominates 
in terms of welfare. Head and Shi (2003) extended the previous analysis to propose a 
dual-currency economy where terms of trade are endogenous and monies are perfectly 
divisible. Legal restrictions were introduced by Li and Wright (1998). Trejos and Wright 
(1996) and Craig and Waller (2000) survey the search literature on dual-currency pay-
ment systems. The proposition of the indeterminacy of the exchange rate was established 
by Karakeen and Wallace (1981) in an overlapping-generations economy.
The coexistence of money and bonds has been discussed by Bryant and Wallace (1979), 
Aiyagari, Wallace, and Wright (1996), Kocherlakota (2001), Shi (2004a,b), and Wallace and 
Zhu (2004). According to Bryant and Wallace (1979), interest-bearing government bonds 
are socially inefﬁ  cient because of intermediation costs to transform large-denomination 
bonds into perfectly divisible intermediary liabilities. Aiyagari, Wallace, and Wright (1996) 
introduced government agents to explain why government bonds are sold at a discount. 
The effects of the government’s trading behavior on the equilibrium outcome have been 
studied more generally in Li and Wright (1998). Kocherlakota (2001) established the 
proposition according to which illiquid bonds can raise society’s welfare when agents 
are subject to idiosyncratic shocks.POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 12, DECEMBER 2005
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Banking 
Payment systems involve ﬁ  nancial intermediaries—in particular, banks—that not only 
supply liabilities that can circulate as mediums of exchange but also provide credit to ﬁ  -
nance productive investments. What kind of economic environments give rise to inter-
mediaries that can issue debt that can be used as a mediums of exchange? What is the re-
lationship between inside (bank) money and outside (ﬁ  at) money? Although the theory 
of banking is still in a very early stage of development, we present here two models that 
attempt to address these questions.
Banks and Safekeeping Services 
Historically, banks have played a role in providing safekeeping services by storing gold 
and silver specie in their vaults. In exchange for their assets, agents receive bank notes 
that are much safer to hold. Since bank notes can serve as means of payment—and, as 
a result, circulate in the economy—banks are able to loan out some the assets that they 
hold for safekeeping.
We now describe a simple model that can account for a demand for safe bank notes. 
Buyers can hold two types of assets: commodity money and bank notes. Commodity 
money can be “minted” from general goods, according to a linear technology. In particular, 
each unit of night good can be transformed into one unit of commodity money, and this 
process is fully reversible (e.g., “coins” can be minted or melted at no cost, and melted 
coins can be consumed). Commodity money is exactly like the capital described in the 
section on Money and Capital, when A = 1.
At night, banks exchange bank notes for commodity money. Let φ  represent the value 
of a bank note in terms of general goods. For convenience, we assume that each bank 
note is a claim to one unit of commodity money. Therefore, φ =1. Banks charge agents a 
per period fee equal to γ , measured in terms of the general good, for each unit of com-
modity money deposited in their vaults. The fee is payable to the bank at the end of the 
following period.
Buyers and sellers are matched at the beginning of each period. A buyer is matched 
with a seller with probability one. Sellers are divided into two types: honest sellers and 
thieves. The fraction of sellers who are thieves is equal to p. Honest sellers can produce 
the search good during the day market (in exchange for money) and consume at night. 
Thieves cannot produce anything during the day, but have the ability to steal a buyer’s 
commodity money. We assume that whenever a thief meets a buyer, he can steal a fraction 
λ  of the buyer’s commodity money: Thieves are unable to steal bank notes. Thieves, like 
honest sellers, consume at night. An agent can sell some or all of his commodity money to 
a bank, receiving one bank note for each unit of commodity money deposited.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
37
Consider a buyer with a portfolio of z units of commodity money and b bank notes at 
the beginning of a period. The buyer’s lifetime expected utility satisﬁ  es
(75)  Vz b p W z b p u q z b Wzdz b bdz
bb b
zb (,) [ ( ),] ( ) {[(,) ] [ (,) , (, =− + − + − − 11 λ b b)]}.
Equation (75) has the following interpretation: A buyer meets a thief with probability p. 
The thief steals a fraction λ  of the buyer’s commodity money, so that the buyer enters 
the night market with () 1−λ z  units of commodity money and b units of bank notes. 
With probability 1 – p, the buyer meets an honest seller, in which case he trades dz units 
of commodity money and db bank notes for q units of the search good. Terms of trade 
(q,dz,db) depend on the buyer’s portfolio (z,b).
The utility of the buyer at night satisﬁ  es
(76)
 
Wz b zb zb Vz b
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=++ − − + + {} 1 βγ β ˆ
ˆ ˆ
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According to (76), at night the buyer chooses his portfolio  (,) zb ˆ ˆ  of commodity money 
and bank notes for the following period. Recall that one unit of commodity money can be 
melted into one unit of general goods at no cost, one unit of general goods can be minted 
into one unit of commodity money, and, for each bank note, the buyer must pay a fee of 
γ  to the bank in the following period.
The terms of trade in bilateral matches are determined by take-it-or-leave-it offers 
by buyers. Therefore, qq = *  if  zbc q +> (* ) ;  otherwise qc zb =+
−1() .  Substituting 
Vb(z,b) by its expression given by (75) into (76), the buyer’s portfolio choice problem 
at night can be reformulated as
(77)
 
max ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( , )
, zb
zr p br p uqzb c qzb −+ −+ + − ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦ − ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦ λγ 1 { {} {} . ˆ
ˆˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
The terms rp + λ  and r +γ  in (77) represent the costs of holding commodity money 
and bank notes, respectively. Since commodity money and bank notes are perfect sub-
stitutes in the day market, buyers choose to hold all their wealth in bank notes when-
ever  pλγ >  and they choose to hold all their wealth in commodity money whenever
pλγ < . In the knife-edge case where  pλγ = , buyers are indifferent between holding 
bank notes or money. These conditions are quite intuitive. The cost of depositing one unit 
of money at the bank is γ , and the beneﬁ  t of holding a bank note is to avoid the loss of 
a fraction λ  of one’s monetary wealth when meeting with a thief, an event that occurs 
with probability p. So, for example, if  pλγ < , the cost associated with holding bank notes 
exceeds the beneﬁ  t; therefore, agents will hold all of their wealth in commodity money. In 
the case where  pλγ > , only bank notes are used in the day to implement trades. Those 
bank notes are fully backed by commodity money in banks’ vaults.POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 12, DECEMBER 2005
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Private Money 
We now consider an environment where banks provide two types of services: They help 
to ﬁ  nance productive investments and they issue notes that can serve as mediums of ex-
change. The benchmark model will be slightly modiﬁ  ed in order to accommodate bank-
ing. Instead of having marketplaces that open sequentially within a period, the “day–
night” structure, we will assume that within a period two sectors are open simultaneously. 
There is a search sector, which mirrors the search market in the benchmark mod-
el, where buyers and sellers are bilaterally matched and sellers can produce the search 
good. There is also a banking sector, where agents can trade with a bank. Trading with a 
bank entails either selling an investment project to the bank in exchange for a bank note, 
where the input for an investment project is the general good, or selling a bank note to 
the bank in exchange for the general good, which is obtained by liquidating an invest-
ment project from the bank’s portfolio. The bank sector here mirrors the night subperiod 
in the benchmark model.
At the beginning of each period, agents are allocated randomly between the two sec-
tors. With probability  π , an agent visits the search sector; with probability 1−π , the 
agent visits the banking sector. If an agent enters the search sector, then with probability 
1
2  he is a buyer and with probability 
1
2  he is a seller. (An agent’s preferences over search 
goods are the same as in the benchmark model and are given by u(q) – c(q). In the 
search sector, buyers and sellers are matched with probability one. Whether or not a 
buyer and a seller can trade depends on the each agent’s portfolio of assets at the time 
they are matched.
In the banking sector, an agent always has the opportunity to fund an investment 
project. The investment project is indivisible and costs y units of the general good to 
be initiated; that is, to initiate the project, the agent must produce y units of the general 
good at a utility cost of y. The project pays off Ay in terms of utility when it is liquidated, 
where  A > 1. The investment project, which is not portable, is “deposited” at the bank, 
in exchange for an indivisible bank note. The investment project can be liquidated in any 
period after the project is initiated; an investment project will be liquidated (and con-
sumed) if an agent presents the bank with a bank note. We assume that an agent cannot 
hold more than one bank note at a time; denote  ρ  as the proportion of agents holding a 
bank note at the end of a period.
We focus on steady-state equilibria where bank notes circulate in the search sector. 
Let Vi denote the value of an agent in the search sector holding i∈{,} 01 bank notes at 
the beginning of a period, and Wi the value of an agent in the banking sector. Consider 
ﬁ  rst an agent in the banking sector. The value functions W0 and W1 satisfy the following 
Bellman equations:FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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(78)  Wy V W V W 01 1 0 0 11 =− ++ − + − max{ ( ) , ( ) }, πβ π β πβ π β
(79)  WA y y V W V W 11 1 0 0 11 = + − + +− +− max{ ( ) , ( ) }. πβ π β πβ π β
According to (78), an agent without money in the banking sector can choose either to 
fund an investment project or not; if a project is funded, then the agent receives a bank 
note. If the agent funds an investment project, he produces y units of the general good 
and starts the next period with one bank note. In the subsequent period, the agent goes 
either to the search sector with probability π  or, with probability 1−π , remains in the 
banking sector. If the agent chooses not to fund an investment project, then he starts the 
next period with no bank note. According to (79) an agent with a bank note in the bank-
ing sector redeems this bank note for Ay units of consumption goods. The agent can then 
decide whether or not to fund a new investment project. Equations (78) and (79) imply 
that
(80)  WW A y 10 =+ .
We are interested in steady-state equilibria where bank notes circulate in the search 
sector. For such an equilibrium to occur, some agents who enter the banking sector must 
be willing to fund an investment project; otherwise, the stock of bank notes would fall 
to zero, as bank notes are redeemed over time. It must also be the case that not all agents 
who enter the banking sector want to fund an investment project; otherwise, all agents in 
the economy will eventually end up with a bank note and no trades would take place in 
the search sector. In equilibrium, agents must be indifferent between funding an invest-
ment and not funding an investment, which implies that
(81)  −+ + − = + − yV W V W πβ π β πβ π β 11 00 11 () ().
Now let’s turn to the value functions of an agent in the search sector. The value func-
tions for an agent in the search market with and without a bank note, V1 and V0, respec-
tively, satisfy the following two Bellman equations:  
(82) 
Vc q V W V W 0 2 11 2 00 11 1 =− + +− +− () +−
ρρ πβ π β πβ π β [( ) ( ) ] [ ( ) ] ,
(83) 
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−− ρρ πβ π β πβ π β [() ( ) ] [ ( ) ] .
According to (82), an agent with no bank note becomes a seller with probability 
1
2  and, 
with probability  ρ , is matched with a buyer who has a bank note. In this case, the agent 
produces q units of the search good and starts the following period with one bank note, 
after which he will go either to the banking sector, with probability π or to the search POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 12, DECEMBER 2005
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sector, with probability 1−π . With probability 12 − ρ /,  an agent with no bank note 
does not trade in the search market and starts the next period as an agent with no bank 
notes. Equation (83) has a similar interpretation. An agent holding a bank note becomes a 
buyer with probability 
1
2  and, with probability 1− ρ, is matched with a seller who does 
not have a bank note. In this case the agent gets q units of the search good and starts the 
subsequent period without a bank note. With probability 11 2 −− (/ ) , ρ  an agent with a 
bank note does not trade in the search market and starts the next period once again as 
an agent with a bank note.
The terms of trades in bilateral matches in the trading sector are determined by take-
it-or-leave-it offers by buyers. A seller is indifferent between accepting a trade or rejecting 
it, if
(84)  −+ + − = + − cq V W V W ( ) () (). πβ π β πβ π β 11 00 11
According to (84), the seller is indifferent between producing q units of the search good 
for the buyer, starting the next period with a bank note or producing nothing, starting the 
next period without a bank note.
From equations (78), (81), (82), and (84), we obtain that
WV V W 00 0 0 1 == + − πβ π β ().
It is easy to see that V0 = W0 = 0. Hence, from (81) and (84) we can deduce that c(q) = y. 
We will assume that  yc q ≤ (* ) ,  so that in the search sector there is no need to introduce 
lotteries over money transfers. Hence, the purchasing power of a bank note in the search 
sector is determined by the cost of funding an investment project in the banking sector, 
i.e., one bank note buys qc y =
−1()  units of the search good.
Finally, we determine the measure  ρ  of agents with bank notes in the steady state. 
Equation (81) represents the indifference between investing and not investing in the 
project. Since V0 = W0 = 0, and, from (80), W1 = Ay, the value of holding a bank note in 


















Equation (85) implies that, as the return of an investment project increases, the value of 
holding a bank note in the trading sector must fall in order to keep agents indifferent be-
tween funding a project or not. The value of holding a bank note in the search sector, as 
expressed by (83), can be simpliﬁ  ed to read
(86)
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 One can obtain an expression for  ρ  by equating the right-hand sides of equations (85) 











































According to (88), the return of an investment cannot be too high or too low for bank 
notes to circulate. If the rate of return on an investment is too low, agents do not ﬁ  nd it 
worthwhile to fund projects; if it is too large, all agents want to fund investment projects, 
so that no trades take place in the trading sector.
This model generates an equilibrium where banks play two roles. They “ﬁ  nance” in-
vestment projects by purchasing an illiquid asset with bank notes and, as a result, they 
provide the economy with a liquid asset: bank notes, which facilitate trades between 
buyers and sellers.
Related Literature 
The model of banking based on crime was proposed by He, Huang, and Wright (2005). 
The model has been extended to endogenize the rate of crime (i.e., the number of thieves 
in the economy) and to allow for a money multiplier. The model of private money is simi-
lar to the one in Williamson (1999, 2002). In addition, Williamson shows that even if pri-
vate monies can be subject to lemon problems and counterfeiting, the introduction of ﬁ  at 
money can decrease welfare. Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999a,b) and Wallace (2004) pro-
posed a model of private money where a subset of agents, called banks, are monitored. 
Those agents can issue notes that can be used as a medium of exchange by nonbank 
agents. They show that the presence of inside money enlarges the set of allocations that 
are incentive-feasible. A model of private money with reserve management has been pro-
vided by Cavalcanti, Erosa, and Temzelides (1999).
Settlement 
In actual economies, ﬁ  at money plays a dual role: It serves as a medium of exchange to 
facilitate trade and it is used to settle debt. In this section, we will consider economies 
where monetary exchange and credit coexist, and where debt must be settled with mon-
ey. The fact that money is required to settle debt can generate liquidity problems in credit 
markets. These liquidity problems will affect the relative price of money, which in turn 
can distort the allocation of resources. Hence, liquidity problems in credit markets can 
spill over into product markets. This line of reasoning has been used to justify the need POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 12, DECEMBER 2005
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for an elastic supply of currency, which is one of the founding principles of the establish-
ment of the Federal Reserve System. In this section we examine a model where debt obli-
gations must be settled with money (that is, a debt obligation cannot be settled by simply 
producing output). We introduce realistic frictions into the settlement process which, in 
turn, generate liquidity problems in credit markets. The speciﬁ  c nature of the settlement 
friction is a mismatch between the time a debtor can repay his debt and the time a credi-
tor needs to be repaid.
The Environment 
We consider an environment in which credit and money coexist and where money is 
used to settle debt obligations. In order to present the ideas in the most economical way, 
we make a slight departure from the benchmark model. We now divide a period into four 
subperiods: morning, day, night, and late night. As in the benchmark model, the day subpe-
riod is characterized by bilateral matching with the production and consumption of the 
search good and the night subperiod is characterized by the production and consump-
tion of the general good. In terms of the two new subperiods, the morning subperiod 
mirrors the night subperiod in that agents produce and consume the general good; the 
late-night subperiod is the time where agents settle their debts. In the late night, debtors 
and creditors ultimately go to a central meeting place in order to settle, with money, any 
outstanding debt that was issued during the previous subperiods.
In contrast to the benchmark model, where agents are inﬁ  nitely lived, now agents live 
for only four subperiods. Buyers are born at the beginning of a period—in the morn-
ing—and die after the settlement phase in the late night of the same period. Sellers are 
born in the day subperiod and die at the end of the morning of the subsequent period. So 
in any particular morning, the economy will be populated with “young” buyers and “old” 
sellers; in all other subperiods, the economy is populated with buyers and sellers who are 
born in the same period. We assume that debts can only be issued in bilateral meetings 
and agents can commit to repay their debts.
During the day, buyers and sellers are matched, where buyers consume the search 
good while sellers produce it. In both the morning and night subperiods, the market for 
general goods is competitive. In contrast to the benchmark model, we assume that buyers 
can produce the general goods but obtain no utility from consuming them, while sellers 
consume market goods but cannot produce them. Buyers’ preferences are described by 
the instantaneous utility function
Uq y u q y
b(,) () , =−
where y is the buyer’s total production of the general good and q is the consumption of 
the search good. Similarly, the preferences for the seller are given byFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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Uq x c q x
s(,) () , =− +
where x is the seller’s total consumption of the general good and q is the amount of the 
search good that is produced. Note that agents do not discount utility across subperiods.
In order to capture the coexistence of money and credit, we assume that buyers are 
heterogenous in terms of when they can produce. Half of the buyers can only produce 
in the morning market, and the other half can only produce in the night market. We call 
the former early producers and the latter late producers. Early-producer buyers can use 
money to trade in the day. In contrast, late-producer buyers are unable to obtain any 
money in the morning. But they are able to repay any debt that is issued in the day by 
producing for money at night. For simplicity, we eliminate any search-matching frictions 
by setting the matching probability σ  to one.
To summarize, the timing of events and the pattern of trade will be as follows: At the 
beginning of a period, a measure one of buyers is born. Half of these buyers, the early 
producers, can produce in the morning. In a competitive market, buyers produce general 
goods in exchange for money and “old” sellers exchange money for the general good. Old 
sellers die at the end of the morning and are replaced by a measure one of new-born 
sellers at the beginning of the day. In the (day) search market, each buyer is matched 
with a seller. Half of the buyers—the early producers—trade with money and the other 
half—the late producers—trade with credit. In order to settle their debts at the end of the 
night period, buyers who traded with credit will produce general goods in exchange for 
money in a competitive market; sellers exchange money for the general good. In the late 
night, buyers and sellers arrive in a meeting place for the purpose of settling debts. Sellers 
who receive money in the late-night settlement subperiod will spend it in the morning of 
the following period before they die.
We focus on stationary equilibria. Money is traded for general goods in competitive 
markets but in the two different subperiods, so we distinguish two prices for money. Let 
φ
am  be the price of money in terms of general goods in the morning and φ
pm  the price 
of money at night.
Frictionless Settlement 
We consider ﬁ  rst the case where there are no frictions in the late-night settlement phase: 
All debtors and creditors arrive simultaneously at a central meeting place and all debts 
are settled instantaneously.
Consider ﬁ  rst a buyer who is an early producer. This buyer produces general goods in 
the morning to get m units of money, which he spends in a bilateral match in the day for 
qm units of the search good. The quantity qm is determined by a take-it-or-leave-it offer 
by the buyer. The seller’s participation constraint is −+ ≥ cq m
m () m a x (, ) , φφ
am pm 0  since 
a seller can spend the money he receives either at night or in the following morning. If POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 12, DECEMBER 2005
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φφ
pm am < , sellers will spend their money in the following morning; but this outcome
is inconsistent with the clearing of the general goods market at night. Therefore, 
max( , ) . φφ φ
am pm pm =  (Note that the buyer has no incentive to use debt because debt 
would have to be repaid with money at the end of the period. But the value of money 
received in the settlement phase is φφ
am pm ≤ .) The early-producer buyer’s choice of 
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From (91) qm = q *  if and only if φφ
am pm = ; if φφ
pm am > , then qm > q *.
At the end of the morning, all of the money in the economy is held by half of the buy-
ers, i.e., the early-producer buyers. Hence, equilibrium in the money market (or in the 
general goods market) in the morning implies M = m/2 and, from the seller’s participa-
tion constraint (90), qm satisﬁ  es
(92)  cq M
m () . = 2 φ
pm
Now let’s turn to the problem of a late-producer buyer. In his bilateral match during 
the day, the late-producer buyer must issue an IOU to pay for the search good, which will 
be repaid in the late-night settlement subperiod. The buyer repays the debt by producing 
output for money at night. The terms of trade in the day match are determined by a take-
it-or-leave-it offer (qd,d) by the buyer, where qd is the amount of search good produced 
by the seller and d is the amount of dollars that the buyer commits to repay in the late-
night settlement subperiod. (It might be convenient to think of the “m” in offer (qm,m) 
as referring to a buyer who uses money to purchase search goods and the “d” in offer 
(qd,d) as referring to a buyer who uses debt.) The offer (qd,d) is given by the solution 
to the buyer’s problem
(93)
 
max[ ( ) ]
, qd
d
d uq d −φ
pm
(94)  s.t.   
am −+ = cq d
d () . φ 0
The seller’s participation constraint has the price φ
am , since the seller spends the 
money obtained in the late-night settlement subperiod the next morning. The solution to 


















From (95), qd = q *  if and only if φφ
am pm = . If φφ
am pm < , then qd < q *.
If φφ
pm am > , then sellers holding money at the beginning of the night will spend all of 
it so that at the end of the night all of the money is held by the late-producer buyers, i.e., 
d/2 = M. If φφ
pm am = , then sellers holding money are indifferent between spending it 
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A steady-state equilibrium is a list (,, , ) qq
md φφ
am pm  that satisﬁ  es (91), (92), (95), and 
(96). It is easy to check that  qm = qd = q *  and φφ
am pm == cq M (* ) / 2  is an equilib-
rium. (And one can show that this is the unique equilibrium for some speciﬁ  cations for u 
and c, e.g., c(q) = q and uq q () ) . = 2  In this equilibrium, the price of money is the same 
in the morning and night markets, and the efﬁ  cient quantity of the search good q *  is 
traded in all matches. Note that early-producer buyers, who use money, are as well off as 
late-producer buyers, who use credit. So, if buyers could choose using money or debt in 
bilateral matches, they would be indifferent between the two means of payment.
Settlement and Liquidity 
We now introduce settlement frictions. Settlement frictions are captured by assuming 
that debtors and creditors arrive and leave the late-night settlement period at different 
times. So a liquidity problem may arise if a creditor leaves the late-night settlement peri-
od before his debtor arrives. To be more speciﬁ  c, the timing during the late-night settle-
ment period is as follows: All of the creditors and a fraction α  of debtors arrive at the 
beginning of the late-night settlement period. Then a fraction δ  of the creditors depart, 
after which the remaining () 1−α  debtors arrive. Finally, the remaining () 1−δ  creditors 
and all of the debtors leave the late-night settlement period; debtors, who are buyers, all 
die, and creditors move into the morning of the next period. We will sometimes refer to 
creditors (debtors) as being early-leaving (-arriving) and late-leaving (-arriving), where the 
meaning is obvious. These arrival and departure frictions will create a need for a resale 
market for debt during the late-night settlement period. We denote  ρ  as the value of one-
dollar of debt in terms of money in this market.
There are agents in the economy who are neither creditors nor debtors; for example, 
sellers who produce search goods for money during the day. These sellers may have an 
incentive to forgo (some) consumption in the night market and instead provide liquidity 
in the late-night settlement period. More speciﬁ  cally, sellers who have money balances at 
the beginning of the night may, in the late-night settlement period, want to buy the IOUs POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 12, DECEMBER 2005
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of early-leaving creditors that will be repaid by late-arriving debtors. For simplicity, and 
with no loss in generality, we assume that sellers with money who choose not to spend 
all of it at night always arrive at the beginning of the late-night settlement period and 
always stay until the end.
The problem of an early-producer buyer must now take into account the possibility 
that a seller who receives money for producing search goods during the day may want to 
use some of it to purchase debt in the late-night settlement period. A seller who receives 
one unit of money in a bilateral match during the day can spend it at night for φ
pm  units 
of the general good, or he can buy 1/ρ  IOUs in the late-night settlement period and then 
purchase φρ
am /  units of the general good the following morning. Since φφ ρ
pm am ≥ /  
is required for the night money market to clear, the seller’s participation constraint is still 
given by cq m
m () . =φ
pm  Hence, the early-producer buyer’s day-bargaining problem is 
(still) given by (89)–(90). As well, the solution to this problem is characterized by (91), 
and the quantity produced in this day match, qm, satisﬁ  es equation (92).
The late-producer buyer’s day-bargaining problem must also take into account the 
frictions that affect settlement in the late-night period. More speciﬁ  cally, since creditor 
sellers may have to sell their IOUs at a discount if they need to leave the settlement phase 
before their debtors arrive, the participation constraint of a seller who trades output for 
debt will be affected. Let θ  denote the expected value to the seller of a one-dollar IOU 
expressed in dollars. The buyer’s bargaining problem can be represented by
(97)
 
max[ ( ) ]
, qd
d
d uq d −φ
pm
(98)  s.t.  
am cq d
d () , −= θφ 0
where θ  satisﬁ  es
(99)
 
θδ αδ α ρ δ
α
ρ
δα =+− + − + − − () ()() () . 111 1
Equation (99) has the following interpretation. With probability δ  a seller holding a one-
dollar IOU must leave the late-night settlement place early. If his debtor has already ar-
rived, an event which occurs with probability α , the IOU is redeemed for one dollar. Oth-
erwise, the IOU is sold at the price  ρ . With probability 1−δ, the seller with a one-dollar 
IOU does not need to leave early. Therefore, the IOU is redeemed for one dollar, irrespec-
tive of the arrival time of his debtor. However, if the debtor arrives early, an event which 
occurs with probability α , the creditor can use the dollar he receives to buy 1/ρ  IOUs 
that will be redeemed for 1/ρ  dollars at the end of the settlement phase. The solution to 



















pm am > /,  then sellers who hold money at the beginning of the night prefer spend-
ing it at night rather than the following morning. As a consequence, the equilibrium of 
the money market implies d/2 = M. If, however, φφ ρ
pm am = /,  then sellers are indif-
ferent between spending money at night or in the morning, so that dM /. 2≤  Since 
cq d
d () , =θφ
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Let us turn to the equilibrium of the second-hand debt market in the late-night settle-
ment period. Denote Δ=− Md /2 as the funds that sellers with money retain at night 
so that they can purchase second-hand IOUs in the late-night settlement period. Note 
that ρ , the price of IOUs in the late-night settlement period, cannot be greater than one; 
otherwise, no one would buy second-hand IOUs. Therefore,  ρ ≤1. The supply of “funds,” 
i.e., money, by creditors who are repaid early and leave late is () / . 12 −δα d  (Recall that 
half of the sellers in the day are paid with IOUs.) The supply of funds of sellers who trans-
acted with money in the day is Δ . The demand of funds from creditors who leave early 






















A steady-state equilibrium is a list (,, ,, ) φφρ
am pm qq
md  that satisﬁ  es (91)–(92) and 
(100)–(102). We distinguish between two types of equilibria: one where  ρ =1 and one 
where  ρ <1. If  ρ =1, then there is no liquidity shortage in the late-night settlement 
period: Second-hand IOUs are sold at par,  ρ =1 and θ =1. The equilibrium conditions 
are then identical to those of the economy without any settlement frictions in the late-
night settlement period, so that qm = qd = q *  and Δ=0. From (102),  ρ =1 requires 
that  () / () , 11 1 −− ≥ δα δ α  or equivalently, αδ ≥ . Intuitively, there is no liquidity short-
age if the measure of debtors who arrive early in the settlement place, α , is larger than 
the measure of creditors who leave early, δ . Creditors who are repaid by early-arriving 
debtors can use this money to purchase the IOUs of creditors who need to sell them, the 
earlier-leaving creditors.
Let us now turn to equilibria where second-hand debt is sold at a discount in the late-
night settlement period, i.e., where  ρ <1. The equilibrium is liquidity-constrained in the 
sense that the amount of money available at the late-night settlement period just prior to 
the departure of the early-leaving creditors is insufﬁ  cient to clear debts at their par value. 
One can ﬁ  rst show that if  ρ <1,  then Δ>0, which implies that sellers with money pro-POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 12, DECEMBER 2005
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vide additional liquidity in the late-night settlement period by only spending a fraction of 
their money balances at night. To see this, suppose to the contrary that Δ=0. Then, from 
(102),  ρδ α δ α =− − () / () 11  and, from (99), θ =1.But then, the equations determining 
(,, , ) qq
md φφ
am pm  are exactly the same as those derived in the model with no settle-
ment frictions implying that φφ
pm am = , which contradicts the no-arbitrage condition 
φφ ρ
pm am ≥ /.  Therefore,  Δ>0, when  ρ <1.
When ρ <1 and Δ>0, condition (101) implies that φφ ρ
pm am = /,  which means that 
sellers with money are indifferent between spending money at night or the following 
morning. Since φφ
pm am >  and θ <1,  equations (95) and (100) imply that the quantities 
traded in the day’s bilateral matches must satisfy qqq
dm << *:  Buyers who trade with 
money in the day receive more output than those who trade with credit.
The liquidity shortage during the late-night settlement period affects the allocation of 
resources by making money more valuable at night than in the morning. Indeed, since 
unsettled debts are sold at a discount during the late-night settlement period, there is an 
additional demand for liquidity at night. The fact that money is more valuable at night 
allows early-producer buyers to consume more, whereas the consumption of late-pro-
ducer buyers falls.
Settlement and Default Risk 
We now introduce an idiosyncratic risk of late-producing buyers defaulting on their debt. 
We formalize the default risk by assuming that the debtor can produce at night with 
probability γ  and, with probability () , 1−γ  he is unable to produce and, hence, defaults 
on his debt. A debtor does not know whether or not he will default before night. There-
fore, in the day, buyers and sellers have symmetric information in their bilateral matches. 
We assume that debtors who are unable to produce, and hence default on their debt, do 
not show up at the late-night settlement period.
The problem of an early-producer buyer is still given by (89)–(90) since transactions 




max[ ( ) ]
, qd
d
d uq d −γφ
pm
(104)  s.t.  
am −+ ′ = cq d
d () . θφ 0
According to (103), the buyer receives qd from the seller and repays his debt with prob-
ability γ. According to (104), the seller who receives a promise of d dollars can expect 
to have  ′ θ d  dollars, at the end of the period, that can be spent the following morning, 
where  ′ θ , the expected value of a one-dollar IOU, now reﬂ  ects not only any settlement 



















In the absence of any settlement frictions, it will be the case that  ′ = θγ  and, therefore, 
qd = q *. The default risk is reﬂ  ected in the amount of money that the buyer commits to 
repay, but the quantity of output traded in bilateral matches remains efﬁ  cient.
Consider a seller who has money at night and who contemplates buying a sec-
ond-hand IOU in the late-night settlement period. The probability that a second-
hand IOU will be repaid conditional on the fact that the debtor did not arrive early is 
γα γ α () / ( ) 11 −− . (There are three possible events for an IOU: It is not repaid, which 
occurs with probability 1−γ; it is repaid early, which occurs with probability γα; it is 
repaid late, which occurs with probability γα () . ) 1−  Therefore, the price  ρ  of a second-
hand IOU cannot be greater than γα γ α () / ( ) 11 −− , in order for debt to clear in the resale 













From (106), in the absence of a liquidity constraint, the price of IOUs simply reﬂ  ects the 
probability of default (conditional on the fact that they have not been redeemed early).
The expected value of an IOU in the day satisﬁ  es
(107)
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ρ
ρ
δα δ γ α ρ ()
*
() ()( ) . 11 1 1
Equation (107) has the following interpretation: The debtor arrives early with probability 
γα. With probability  δ  the creditor leaves early, in which case he gets the par value of 
the IOU. With probability 1−δ, he can stay late and use his money to buy a second-hand 
IOU at the price  ρ . The probability that the second-hand IOU is repaid is  ρ *. The debt-
or arrives late with probability γα () . 1−  If the creditor can wait, with probability 1−δ, 
he receives one dollar at the end of the settlement phase. Finally, if the debtor does not 
arrive early (because he defaults or because he arrives late), an event that occurs with 
probability 1−γα, and if the creditor leaves early, with probability δ , then the creditor 
sells his IOU at the price  ρ . If liquidity is not scarce in the late-night settlement period, 
ρρ = * and  ′ = θγ .
The equilibrium is not liquidity-constrained whenever γα δ δ αγ ρ () ( ) * 11 −≥ −  which, 
from (106), is equivalent to αδ ≥ . This is precisely the condition we had in the absence 
of default risk. The fact that the rate of repayment γ  does not inﬂ  uence the condition for 
a liquidity shortage can be explained as follows: Consider an increase in the repayment POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 12, DECEMBER 2005
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rate. On the one hand, the number of creditors who are repaid early increases, so there 
is more liquidity in the late-night settlement period. On the other hand, the price of sec-
ond-hand debt increases in the late-night settlement period, so the demand for liquidity 
is higher. The two effects just cancel each other.
Related Literature 
The model of settlement presented in this section is closely related to the one by Free-
man (1996a,b). Freeman considered an overlapping-generations economy with heteroge-
nous agents. Some agents trade with debt, while others trade with money. As in our analy-
sis, all debts are settled in a central clearing house. Freeman (1999) extends the model to 
allow for aggregate default risk. Green (1999) shows that the role of the central bank as 
a clearing house can be assumed by ordinary private agents. Zhou (2000) discusses the 
literature. Temzelides and Williamson (2001) consider two related models, a model with 
spatial separation and a random-matching model, and investigate different types of pay-
ment arrangements: monetary exchange, banking with settlement, and banking with in-
terbank lending. They show that payment systems with net settlement generate efﬁ  cien-
cy gains, and interbank lending can support the Pareto-optimal allocation in the absence 
of idiosyncratic shocks.
Policy and Payments
Optimality of the Friedman Rule
In this section, we determine the optimal growth rate of the money supply in the econ-
omy with divisible money that was examined in the section on Divisible Money. Let Mt 
represent the stock of money at date t, and π the constant rate of growth of the money 
supply, i.e.,  MM tt =+ −1 1 () . π  Money is injected or withdrawn in a lump-sum fashion in 
the centralized market: If π > 0, then injections of money take place at the beginning of 
the centralized market; if π < 0, then money is withdrawn at the end of the centralized 
market. Without loss of generality, we assume that money transfers go only to the buyers. 
We focus on steady-state equilibria where the real value of the money supply is constant 
over time, i.e., φφ tt t t MM = ++ 11 . In equilibrium, the price of money in terms of general 
goods is falling at rate  π .
To take into account that the price of money is not constant across time, we write the 
value functions Vb and Wb as functions of the buyer’s real balances, φtt m . The Bellman 
equations for Vb and Wb are given by
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We assume that prices are determined by take-it-or-leave-it offers by buyers. This implies 
that the quantity traded in a match satisﬁ  es  cq m tt t () =φ wheneverφtt mc q ≤ (* ) .  The 
buyer’s problem at time t can be generalized to read
(108)
 
max ( ) ( ) .
m
tt t t mm u q m c q m −+ + () − () () ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦ {} ++ + φφ β σ φ φ 11 1 ˆ
ˆ
ˆˆ ˆ
According to (108), the buyer at night who wishes to hold φt m +1 ˆ real balances the follow-
ing day must produce φtm ˆ  of night goods. In the following day, he trades with probability 
σ , in which case he extracts all the surplus of the match. Denote the buyer’s choice of 
real balances as  zm t = + φ 1 ˆ  and the nominal interest rate as i, where 11 1 += + + ir () () . π  
Through the seller’s participation constraint, there is a one-to-one relationship between z 
and q for all  zc q ≤ (* ) ,  i.e., z = c(q). Hence, the buyer’s problem (108) can be rewritten 
more compactly as a choice for q,
(109)
 
max { ( ) [ ( ) ( )]},
[,* ] qq

















This equation is similar to (53), except for the fact that the real interest rate, r, has been 
replaced by the nominal interest rate, i. The cost of holding real balances, i, generates a 
wedge that is proportional to the average length of time to complete a trade in the day 
market, 1/ . σ
From (110), it is clear that the optimal monetary policy corresponds to the Friedman 
rule, which requires the nominal interest rate i to be set equal to zero, or equivalently, 
that the rate of growth of the money supply be negative and approximately equal to the 
rate of time preference. Intuitively, by reducing the cost of holding real balances to zero, 
the Friedman rule maximizes the demand for real balances and, therefore, the quantities 
traded in individual matches. The allocation of the monetary equilibrium under the Fried-
man rule coincides with the socially efﬁ  cient allocation, i.e.,  qq = * .
The result that the Friedman rule generates the ﬁ  rst-best allocation is sensitive to the 
choice of the bargaining solution. To see this, let’s assume that the terms of trade, (q,d), 
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uq d cq d d m −−+ ≤ φφ    s.t.   
If the constraint dm ≤  binds (and it will in equilibrium), then the relationship between 












Since there is a one-to-one relationship between z and q for all qq ∈[,* ] , 0  the buyer’s 
choice of real balances can be rewritten as a choice of q, i.e.,
(113) 
 
max { ( ) [ ( ) ( )]}.
[,* ] qq





At the Friedman rule, the buyer simply chooses q to maximize his surplus, u(q) – z(q). 
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According to equation (114), the buyer receives a fraction  ′′ + ′ uq uq cq () / [() () ]  of the 
match surplus. Since  ′′ + ′ uq uq cq () / [() () ]  is decreasing in q, it is easy to show that the 
buyer’s surplus is decreasing in q when q is close to q *. Therefore, buyers choose an 
inefﬁ  ciently low value for q, even when the cost of holding real balances is zero. This 
inefﬁ  ciency is due to the nonmonotonicity of the Nash bargaining solution, according 
to which the buyer’s surplus can fall even if the match surplus increases. However, de-
spite the fact that real balances are “too low,” the optimal monetary policy is still the 
Friedman rule.
Trading Frictions and the Friedman Rule
There are two dimensions associated with trading in a search environment: the quanti-
ties traded in individual matches, sometimes called the intensive margin, and the number 
of matches, sometimes called the extensive margin. Monetary policy can affect both mar-
gins. As we have seen, monetary policy affects agents’ choices of real balances and, there-
fore, the intensive margin. But it can also affect agents’ costs of participating in the market 
and, therefore, the extensive margin. In the previous section, we saw that the Friedman 
rule takes care of the intensive margin because it maximizes buyers’ real balances and, 
therefore, the quantities traded in bilateral matches. However, it is not at all clear whether 
the Friedman rule generates an efﬁ  cient extensive margin and, more generally, whether it 
is the optimal monetary policy when the number of trades is endogenous.
In order to generate an extensive-margin effect, we have to slightly alter our bench-
mark model. Assume now that there is a unit measure of ex ante identical agents that 
can choose to be buyers or sellers in the day market. Suppose, for instance, that there are FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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two goods produced during the day: an intermediate good and a ﬁ  nal consumption good, 
which requires the intermediate good as an input. The ﬁ  nal consumption good can only 
be consumed by the agent who produces it, and agents have to specialize in one of the 
production technologies. Agents who produce intermediate goods are sellers, while those 
who produce ﬁ  nal goods are buyers. Hence, the intermediate good will be produced and 
traded in bilateral matches between buyers and sellers during the day.
The fraction of buyers is denoted by n, whereas the fraction of sellers is  1 – n. The 
matching technology between buyers and sellers is as follows: A buyer meets a seller with 
probability 1 – n, the fraction of sellers in the population. A seller meets a buyer with 
probability n, the fraction of buyers in the population. As a consequence, the number 
of matches in the day market is n(1 – n). The number of matches is maximized when 
n = 1
2.
Clearly, the way in which the terms of trade are determined will affect an agent’s 
choice of which side of the market to participate in, i.e., whether to be a buyer or a seller. 
Here we will assume that the terms of trade are determined by a simple proportional 
bargaining solution, according to which the buyer’s surplus is a fraction θ ∈(,) 01  of the 
total match surplus, i.e.,
(115)   uq d uq cq ( ) [ ( ) ( )], −= − φθ
where q is the level of intermediate goods produced in a match and d is the monetary 
transfer from the buyer to seller. Furthermore, the trade (q,d) is pairwise Pareto-efﬁ  cient 
so that qq = *  if φθθ mu q c q ≥− + () ( * )( * ) 1 and d = m otherwise. Assuming the con-
straint dm ≤  is binding, there is a simple relationship between q and  zm =φ ,
(116)   zu q c q =− + ( )() () . 1 θθ
The buyer’s expected utility at night Wm
b() φ satisﬁ  es a Bellman equation similar to 
(113) except that σ  is replaced by 1 – n. Hence, the buyer’s choice of real balances:
(117) 
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The problem in (117) takes into account the fact that the buyer obtains a fraction θ  of 
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An agent will be indifferent between a buyer and a seller if Wm Wm
bs () () . φφ =  Since 
both value functions are linear, the choice of being a buyer or seller is independent of the POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 12, DECEMBER 2005
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money balances of the agent when he enters the centralized market. After some calcula-
tion, the condition  Wb(0) = Ws(0) yields
(119)  −− + + − − = − − iu q c q n u q c q nu q c q [( ) ( ) ( )] ( ) [ ( ) ( )] ( )[ ( ) ( )]. 11 1 θθ θ θ
Equation (119) can be explained as follows: The left-hand side is the buyer’s payoff. It is 
the sum of two elements: the cost of carrying  zu q c q =− + ( )() () 1 θθ  real balances and 
the expected surplus of a match. The right-hand side is the seller’s payoff, which is simply 
the seller’s expected surplus of a match.
We ﬁ rst ask whether the Friedman rule generates the ﬁ  rst-best allocation. As the nomi-
nal interest rate, i, tends to zero, equation (118) implies that q approaches q*, and equa-
tion (119) implies that n approaches θ , the buyer’s bargaining power. As before, the 
Friedman rule generates the efﬁ  cient intensive margin; this is true even though the buyer 
does not have all the bargaining power. However, if θ  is different from one-half, the 
composition of buyers and sellers will be socially inefﬁ  cient at the Friedman rule. The 
requirement that θ = 1
2  for the composition of buyers and sellers to be efﬁ  cient is related 
to the Hosios (1990) condition for efﬁ  ciency in search models, according to which efﬁ  -
ciency is achieved when an agent’s bargaining power coincides with his contribution to 
the matching process. A buyer’s bargaining power is θ , whereas his contribution to the 
matching process is 1 – n, the fraction of sellers in the economy. From equation (119), it 
is straightforward to see that the condition θ = n  is satisﬁ  ed at the Friedman rule. There-
fore, if  i = 0 and the buyer’s bargaining power coincides with his contribu-
tion to the matching process, then θ = 1
2 .
We now ask whether a deviation from the Friedman rule can be optimal. We measure 
social welfare by  W =− − nn u q c q ( )[ ( ) ( )]. 1  The effect of a change in the inﬂ  ation rate 
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As the cost of holding real balances increases, the number of buyers decreases. This effect 
can be easily understood from equation (119). An increase in inﬂ  ation has a direct nega-
tive effect on buyers, which is given by the right-hand side of (119). When a match oc-
curs, this cost of holding the real balances is sunk and, hence, cannot be recovered by the 
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So a deviation from the Friedman rule is optimal whenever  θ > 1
2. In this case, there are FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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too many buyers and, therefore, too few trades. An increase in inﬂ  ation reduces the num-
ber of buyers and increases the number of sellers, and, therefore, increases the number 
of trades. Inﬂ  ation also reduces the quantities traded in individual matches, but since this 
has only a second-order effect close to the Friedman rule, overall welfare will increase.
Distributional Effects of Monetary Policy
Inﬂ  ation can be beneﬁ  cial when the number of trades is inefﬁ  cient because it affects 
agents’ decisions to participate in the market. Monetary policy can also have a positive ef-
fect on the extensive margin when the distribution of money balances is not degenerate. 
To capture this distributional effect of monetary policy, we modify the benchmark model 
as follows: Buyers and sellers live for only three subperiods—they are born at night and 
die at the end of the following period. Agents can, therefore, potentially trade three times: 
In the night when they are born, on the following day, and in the night just before they 
die. Assume that agents do not discount across periods. This implies that the Friedman 
rule corresponds to a zero inﬂ  ation rate. In order to obtain a nondegenerate distribution 
of money balances across agents, we assume that only a fraction p of newly born buyers 
get access to the centralized general goods market, say, because they are productive. The 
remaining 1 – p (unproductive) buyers are excluded and, therefore, are unable to ac-
quire money to be able to trade in the next day’s market.
The problem of a newly born buyer who has access to the centralized night market, 
which is similar to problem (108), is
(122)
  
m a x {[( ) ] [( ) ] }. tt t t mm u q m c q m −+ + − {} ++ + φφ σ φ φ 11 1
m ˆ
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ
Since the buyer has access to the centralized general goods market when he is born, he 
can produce to accumulate the  ˆ m money balances he needs to trade in the next day’s 
search market. If he doesn’t meet a seller during the day, he spends his money balances 
in the night before he dies; if he does meet a seller, we assume that he captures the entire 
surplus from the match. Denote  zm t = + φ 1 ˆ  as the buyer’s choice of real balances for the 
next day’s search market. The buyer’s problem (122) can be simpliﬁ  ed to read
(123) 
 
max { [ ( )] [ ( )]} .
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zu q z c q z −+ − {} πσ











Therefore, whenever the money supply is constant, i.e., when π = 0, newly born buy-
ers who are not excluded from the centralized general goods market can trade qq = *  POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 12, DECEMBER 2005
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units of the search good the following day. However, if the money supply is constant, then 
those (unproductive) buyers who are excluded from the night market when they are 
young receive no money transfers and, therefore, cannot consume during the day.
Assume now the there is a steady state inﬂ  ation and that money is injected into the 
economy through lump-sum transfers to buyers. Let Tt denote a transfer at night in pe-
riod t. We have  TM M M tt t t =− = +1 π . Let mt represent the money balances of buyers in 
the morning of period t who had access to the centralized general goods market when 
they were young. Hence, equilibrium in the money market requires that
(124)   pm p T M tt t +− = − () . 1 1





























Note from (126), that Tm tt − < 1  so that unproductive buyers have less money balances 
than buyers who had access to the night market when young. Let    q  denote the quan-
tities traded by unproductive buyers. Since cq m tt t () =φ  and cq T tt t ()   = − φ 1 from the 










From (127)    qq tt <   and lim . π→∞ =   qq tt  So the planner faces a trade-off between 
smoothing consumption across buyers and preserving the purchasing power of real bal-
ances. Welfare is measured by W =− + − − σσ puq c q p uq c q [ ( ) ( )] ( )[ ( ) ( )]. 1     It can be 



























An increase in inﬂ  ation from π = 0 is optimal because it allows unproductive buyers to 
consume, while the negative effect on productive buyers’ welfare is only second-order.
Settlements and Monetary Policy
Assume for the time being that there is no default risk and that there is a liquidity short-
age in the late-night settlement period. There will be a liquidity shortage when the frac-
tion of creditors who depart early,  δ , is greater than the fraction of debtors who arrive FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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early,  α . In this situation, the market clearing price for debt in the late-night settlement 
period,   ρ , will be less than one. As well, sellers who produced search goods for mon-
ey during the day will only spend a fraction of their balances in the competitive general 
goods market at night and will use the remainder to purchase IOUs in the late-night set-
tlement period. This implies that the levels of search good production will be inefﬁ  cient; 
in particular,  qqq
dm << *,  where qd is the amount of search goods produced for a buy-
er who purchases with an IOU and  qm  is the amount of search goods produced for a 
buyer who purchases with money. Hence, the late-night liquidity problem results in inef-
ﬁ  cient levels of production of search goods during the day.
Suppose now that there exists a central bank that can provide “liquidity” to the late-
night settlement period. More speciﬁ  cally, the central bank purchases Δ
cbamount of 
IOUs from early-leaving creditors in exchange for ﬁ  at money. When the late-arriving debt-
ors come to the late-night settlement period, the central bank will exchange the IOUs for 
ﬁ  at money. Recall that the supply of funds by creditors who are paid early and stay late is     
() / 12 −δα d  and that the face value of bonds of the creditors who leave early and whose 
issuers arrive late is  δα () / . 12 − d  If  Δ
cb ≥− () / , δα d 2  then the liquidity problem is 
solved and it will be the case that   ρ =1. This temporary supply of liquidity by the mon-
etary authority resembles either a discount window policy or an open market operation. 
As an open market operation, the central bank purchases () / δα − d 2 units of bonds 
before the early-leaving creditors depart and “sells” the bonds back after the late arriving 
debtors arrive. As a discount window policy, the central bank stands ready to purchase 
second-hand IOUs at their par value, with the understanding that the IOUs have to be re-
purchased at their par value before the late-night settlement period ends. One can imag-
ine one of the late-leaving creditors—call him the clearinghouse—gathers () / δα − d 2 
units of IOUs from early-leaving creditors, exchanging them with the central bank for 
money, with the understanding that the IOUs will be repurchased before the late-night 
settlement period ends. When the late-arriving debtors arrive, the clearinghouse can ob-
tain money from the debtors whose creditors have already left, repurchase the debt from 
the central bank, and return the IOUs to the original issuers. The increase in the money 
supply that results from the open market operation or discount window policy is not 
inﬂ  ationary, since the IOUs purchased by the monetary authority are all redeemed within 
the period so that the stock of currency remains constant across periods. This policy is 
also in accordance with the real bills doctrine, which considers that the stock of money 
should be allowed to ﬂ  uctuate to meet the needs of trade.
Note that a central bank is not needed in order to overcome the liquidity problem. Sup-
pose that a late-leaving creditor, say a clearinghouse, purchases the debt of early-leaving 
creditors with his own IOUs, with the understanding that the IOU’s of the clearinghouse 
can be exchanged for money at the beginning of the next period, before the early-morn-
ing general goods market opens. When the late-arriving debtors arrive, the clearinghouse POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 12, DECEMBER 2005
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will exchange the debt that it holds for money. At the beginning of the next period, 
the clearinghouse can repurchase its debt with money before the general goods market 
opens. Hence, as long as the clearinghouse is able to repurchase the debt it has issued, 
the liquidity problem that arises due to the settlement frictions can be overcome by pri-
vate agents: It is not necessary for a central bank to exist in order to deal with a liquidity 
problem that may arise due to settlement frictions.
Related Literature
The result according to which the optimal monetary policy requires setting the nominal 
interest rate to zero or, equivalently, deﬂ  ating at the rate of time preference, comes from 
Friedman (1969). Different deﬁ  nitions and interpretations of the Friedman rule are dis-
cussed in Woodford (1990). The optimal monetary policy in a search model with divis-
ible money was ﬁ  rst studied by Shi (1997), who showed that the Friedman rule is opti-
mal when agents’ participation decisions are exogenous. The ability of the Friedman rule 
to generate the ﬁ  rst-best allocation when the terms of trade are determined according to 
some bargaining solution are discussed in Rauch (2000), Lagos and Wright (2005), and 
Rocheteau and Waller (2004).
The importance of trading frictions and search externalities for the design of mon-
etary policy was ﬁ  rst emphasized by Li (1995, 1997), who established that an inﬂ  ation 
tax could be welfare enhancing when agents’ search intensities are endogenous. How-
ever, her results are subject to the caveat that prices are exogenous. Shi (1997) found a 
related result in a divisible-money model where prices are endogenous. In Shi’s model, 
each household has a large number of members who can be divided between buyers 
and sellers. When the composition of buyers and sellers is inefﬁ  cient, a deviation from 
the Friedman rule can be welfare improving. Rocheteau and Waller (2004) discuss Shi’s 
ﬁ  nding under alternative bargaining solutions. Berentsen, Rocheteau, and Shi (2001) es-
tablished the result according to which the efﬁ  cient allocation is achieved when both the 
Hosios rule and the Friedman rule are satisﬁ  ed. A necessary condition for a deviation from 
the Friedman rule to be optimal is that the Hosios condition is violated. Rocheteau and 
Wright (2004) study the optimal monetary policy in a model with free entry of sellers 
under alternative pricing mechanisms.
The welfare-improving role of a monetary expansion through distributional effects has 
been studied by Levine (1991), and in a search-theoretic environment by Molico (1997), 
Deviatov, and Wallace (2002), and Berentsen, Camera, and Waller (2004).
Freeman (1996a) and (1996b) provides a framework to study the settlement of debt 
with money in a model with no aggregate risk. Freeman (1999) adds aggregate risk to the 
analysis. Green (1999) provides a general overview of a settlements model and demon-
strates that a central bank is not needed to provide liquidity to the economy if there is a 
“shortage”; agents in the model are able to provide the requisite liquidity.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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